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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Until the 21st century, fossil-fuel had long dominated the energy scene as the main energy 
supply sources in the world. It accounted for about 80 percent of the world’s total primary 
energy supply and 64 percent of electricity generation in 1999 (Jacobsson and Lauber, 
2006). In recent times, however, there are increasing calls for a paradigm shift towards 
renewable energy (RE) generation (ibid). These calls are directed at mitigating the 
harmful effects of fossil fuel, notably climate change and also to promote socio-economic 
development and environmental co-benefits. Nonetheless, adoption of renewable energy 
technologies (RETs) is met with stiff oppositions, mainly from high profile energy players 
who obstruct the process and subsequently promote their interest (Barnett et al., 2016). 
A complete understanding of the reasons behind such oppositions is crucial for successful 
development of REs since that will help provide sustainable solutions to the root causes 
of low investment in RETs in a developing country like Ghana. A Political Economy 
Analysis (PEA) approach provides the necessary scope to unearth such reasons that fuel 
opposition and obstruction from stakeholders to the REs investment. Newell et al., (2014), 
observe that a political economy analysis creates the avenue to get beneath the formal 
structures in a bid to unearth the underlying interests, incentives and institutions that 
foster or frustrate change. It could help consolidate interests of all energy players in order 
to facilitate the paradigm shift of accelerating the rate of development of RETs. According 
to Arndt (1983), Political Economy (PE) concept has a broad range of applications and 
offers in-depth analysis of what an ordinary study may not be able to tease out. For 
instance, a PE application to an organisation, could enhance a better understanding of 
the interaction between sets of major economic and socio-political forces that affect 
collective behaviour and performances within such an organisation (Archol et al., 1983). 
In the energy sector, its application aids in the understanding of clean energy transitional 
issues (Baker et al., 2014). According to Isoaho et al., (2016) the recent application of 
PEA in energy related issues such as RE development  is due to the fact that socio-
technical literature failed to address adequately, the complexity and dynamics of clean 
energy development. A PEA should therefore, identify all forms of ‘competing ideas, 
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interests, values and preferences; where specific groups and interests struggle over the 
control, production, use and distribution of resources; where conflict is negotiated; where 
bargains are struck; and where formal and informal political settlements, alliances and 
coalitions are made and broken’ (Hudson and Leftwich, 2014: pp.6, cited in Barnett, 
2014). The use of PEA should therefore help understand why socially and economically, 
desirable plans and policies are regarded being difficult to be implemented by policy 
makers (Barnett et al., 2016).  
Khan (2011), using a PEA approach, studied the situation under which a ruling 
government or a coalition in the power sector will promote clean energy development. 
According to him, a change towards clean energy transition is most likely to happen if 
governments or ruling coalitions face pressure from powerful groups in society who either 
are negatively affected by current non-renewable energy sources or stand to benefit from 
clean energy promotion. In the study by Tsebelis (2002), which focused on India, PEA 
was used to analyse the extent to which RE sources can be developed to their fullest 
capacity in the country. The study concluded that in order to bring RE development onto 
the policy arena, stakeholders with vested interest and veto powers such as the mining 
companies, coal power producers are critical to breaking strong oppositions to RE 
development.  
In related studies, Fattouh and El-Katiri (2015) and Oda and Tusjita (2010) also used PEA 
to study factors that prevent governments and energy players from implementing certain 
economic and environmental policies. Citizenry agitations for fair share of natural 
resources (oils and fossil resources and grid extension) and the fear of losing elections 
by political actors emerged strongly as factors accounting for the non-implementation of 
such policies. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region lends clear evidence to 
this, in which the incessant protests and agitations waged by the citizenry for social equity 
and fair sharing of national resources have compelled governments to subsidise fossil-
fuel energy sources (Fattouh and El-Katiri, 2015). In Asia, Commander (2012) observed 
similar occurrences, as political unrest and protests forced governments to keep prices 
of petrol and diesel substantively lower than international prices between 2008 and 2010. 
Such agitations from citizens and the fear of losing political power have the effect of 
influencing governments and policy makers to overlook viable RE development policies. 
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Oda and Tsujita (2010) argue that these protests and political unrest are more common 
in jurisdictions that lack democratic institutions. Brown and Mobarak (2009) further argued 
that countries without democratic political systems and institutional structures often use 
energy allocations and subsidies as tools for political advantage. Supporting this view, 
Scott and Seth (2013) submit that often times, in non-democratic states, electricity 
distributions favour industries than residential areas, hence, a source of the protest. Such 
motives and actions greatly affect the development of RE.  
Gupta and Köhlin (2006) note that there is an opportunity cost of failing to sell energy at 
actual market prices, as such revenue can be used by government in diverse ways 
including, the reduction of budget deficit and the size of the public debt; increasing 
investment expenditure in cheaper, clean and environmental friendly energy technologies 
that can generate several socio-economic benefits. According to Sdralevich et al., (2014), 
though these policies seek to promote social equity, they actually benefit people within 
the middle and upper-classes in reality. Indicative of the above literature is the increasing 
economic and environmental costs of fossil fuel, faced by many developing economies 
yet, RE sources in these economies remain well under-developed through inadequate 
investments. It is therefore imperative to understand the underpinning constraints to the 
least investments in these RE sources in developing countries especially, Ghana through 
the application of the PE framework. 
1.2 Purpose of the Study 
Provisions for RE development have featured in the energy policy landscape in Ghana 
for some time now.  The current national Medium-Term Development policy for the 
country (Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda Two (GSGDA II) talks about 
the need to increase the proportion of renewable energy  in the supply mix, particularly 
solar, wind, mini- hydro and waste-to-energy(NDPC, 2014). Strategies enshrined in this 
development plan document for the achievement of this policy target include: the 
implementation of the Renewable Energy Act, 2011, (Act 832); provision of access to 
waste-to energy technologies and facilitation of access to the grid for stand-alone 
renewable energy power plants. The current Energy Policy sets a policy target of 10 
percent contribution of renewable energy to  Ghana’s energy generation mix by 2020 
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(MoE, 2010). In addition, there is the RE Act, 2011, Act 832, which gives the legislative 
backing for the promotion and development of renewable technologies. The Feed-in-Tariff 
(FiT), mini-grid infrastructure systems development and the RE Fund are provisions in 
Act 832 that demonstrate Ghana’s quest to diversify its energy sources to take account 
of RE development.  
Notwithstanding the existence of various policy and legislative instruments in support of 
RE development in Ghana, the contribution of RETs to the energy generation mix is still 
very low. At present, the share of REs’ contribution to the energy generation mix is about 
0.1 percent (Energy Commission, 2015). With less than four years to the elapsing of the 
Energy Policy target of 10% share from RE generation within the total generation mix, the 
attainment of this target is highly unlikely unless there is massive investment. 
Paradoxically, Ghana is signatory to several international agreements including,  the post-
2015 UN Sustainable Development Goals that aim at tackling climate change and 
variability  through environmentally sustainable development pathways such as  the 
enhancement of  RETs. In practice, however, the development trajectories being pursued 
at the moment are unsustainable (UNEP-Ghana, 2013, UNEP-Ghana, 2015). Thermal-
powered electricity generation, which in most cases is powered by fossil fuels, now 
accounts for 56.5 percent of installed plant capacity in Ghana, generating about 49 
percent of total electricity (Energy Commission, 2016). In addition, Government envisions 
to increase electricity generation from thermal sources to about 80 percent in the next 
decade.1 This leaves the future development of new renewables such as solar PVs, wind 
turbines, waste-to-energy in the balance despite the numerous policy instruments.  
The main aim of this report is to unravel the complexity as well as identify the alignments 
of interests or alliances surrounding the advancement or blockage of the implementation 
of very fundamental policies, initiatives and strategies for RE investment and 
development in Ghana. The identification of these varied factors and actors in favour of 
                                                          
1 http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Gov-t-projects-80-of-power-plants-to-be-thermal-
430382; http://www.urbanafrica.net/urban-vocies/15378/ (Accessed: 15/8/2016) 
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or, against the key policies and initiatives will provide a leverage for the proposition of 
lasting solutions for the enhancement of RE investment in the country.  
1.3 Structure of Report 
This report is structured into five sections. Following the introductory section is section 
Two, which discusses the policy and institutional framework of Ghana’s energy sector, 
the detailed historical accounts of energy reforms together with their policy directives, 
detailed account of the level of engagement, contributions, and policy influences of 
relevant stakeholders in Ghana’s energy sector. Furthermore, it discusses three various 
policy agenda of relevant energy players in Ghana’s energy sector. Section Three details 
the PEA methodological perspectives underpinning this study. It also outlines the genesis 
of how the binding constraints on RE investment in Ghana were identified as well as the 
mapping of promising policies with potential to address the binding constraints. 
Discussions and analyses of the proponents and obstructers of the key policies and 
initiatives fundamental to RE investment and development and, the supporting discourses 
are encapsulated in section Four. Section Five provides the conclusion, covering the 
prerequisite coalition interventions for change to bring about solutions for enhanced RE 
investments in Ghana. 
 
2. REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT OF GHANA’S ENERGY SECTOR 
Ghana’s energy sector has gone through series of transformation since independence. 
In this section, the history of Ghana’s power sector is first and foremost discussed, 
followed by the regulatory landscape of Ghana’s energy sector. The section will then 
examine the contextual focus under which the energy generations were carried out: 
energy security, competitiveness, productivity enhancement, or low carbon development.  
2.1 History of Ghana’s Power Sector  
Electricity generation in Ghana can broadly be classified into three main phases: ‘before 
the Akosombo era’ (1914 to 1966), the ‘Hydro Years’ (1966 to mid-1980s) and the 
‘Thermal Complementation Years’ (from mid-1980s to present) (ISSER, 2005). The pre-
Akosombo era had small scale electricity generation from diesel-powered generators. 
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These were owned by individuals, institutions and municipalities who could afford. The 
first public power plant was established in 1914 in Sekondi and was used to power the 
operations and activities of the then Gold Coast Railway Administration (GCRA) (ISSER, 
2005). In 1922, small scale public electricity was established and operated by the then 
Public Works Department (PWD) to electrify major towns in Ghana. It covered the Accra 
Township and later in 1926, coverage was extended to Koforidua. Between 1927 and 
1932 the PWD undertook a restricted evening supply arrangement system to Kumasi, 
Swedru, Tamale and Cape Coast Townships (ibid). During this era, determination of 
power generation were carried out solely by Ghana’s colonial leaders, some public 
institutions (such as PWD and GCRA) and individuals who were resourceful to own and 
operate generator sets. Issues of climate change, renewable energy development, 
energy security, competiveness and job creation were non-existent in the objectives of 
energy generation as they were not issues of outmost concern.   
Energy security, job creation and to some extent renewable energy development, 
however, became more relevant in the ‘Hydro Years’ of power generation in Ghana. The 
desire to develop Ghana’s huge bauxite reserves as part of having integrated bauxite and 
aluminum industry marked the beginning of the Hydro years (ISSER, 2005). This idea of 
developing a hydro dam was conceived by the colonial leaders, but was later developed 
under the administration of Ghana’s first President, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. Ajena was the 
initial site for the construction of the dam, but was later changed to Akosombo based on 
the recommendations from the engineers - Kaiser Engineers. This era saw a much more 
organised power sector, as cabinet passed the Volta River Development Act, 1961 (Act 
46) for the establishment of the Volta River Authority (VRA). The VRA was mandated to 
foresee the construction of the Akosombo dam, its power station as well as the generation 
of electricity (ISSER, 2005). In 1967, a law (NLCD 125) was passed for the establishment 
of the Electricity Corporation of Ghana (ECG). This enhanced the setting up of vibrant 
institutions to oversee adequate production of energy that fed industries and businesses, 
and subsequently offered job opportunities in diverse forms. Energy security emerged as 
an important issue under this era because other initiatives were introduced to develop 
more hydro sites in addition to the Akosombo Power Plant (Edjekumhene, 2001; ISSER, 
2015). The Kaiser Engineers company was contracted in 1971 to undertake exploratory 
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studies on possible hydro power sites and upon completion, recommended the 
construction of hydro power plant at Kpong. Unlike the pre-hydro years, this era marked 
the beginning of modern electricity generation in Ghana and did involve the participation 
of several stakeholders (ISSER, 2005).  Kaiser Engineers Company from Chile, local 
public institutions (VRA and ECG), donor organisations (World Bank, USAID, the UK 
Government, the Canadian Government, the Saudi Government and European 
Agencies) all contributed to the development of hydro power in Ghana (Edjekumhene, 
2001; ISSER, 2015). Accordingly, there were absolutely no or minimal agitations in the 
development of these power infrastructure within this era since the system was ready for 
bulk power production (ibid). 
The thermal complementary phase of Ghana’s power sector was highly driven by energy 
security issues and little about the development of other competitive energy resources. 
Climate change mitigation issues were of little concern as evidence shows that the 
development of the power sector within this era propelled the increase in the country’s 
carbon footprint. According to Opam and Turkson (2000), this era was necessitated by 
the adverse effect of the prolonged drought that occurred between 1982 and 1984 in the 
country. On the basis of the drought, the generation potentials of the existing two hydro 
power plants (Akosombo and Kpong) were affected as the available water were far below 
the minimum operating level. (ibid). The shortage in electricity supply amidst the growing 
energy demand sector necessitated the major reformation of the power sector. Thus, in 
1985, Government of Ghana commissioned the ‘Ghana Generation Planning Study’ 
(GGPS) to help identify alternative energy sources that will aid in reducing the 
vulnerability of the hydro power systems (ISSER, 2005). The study recommended thermal 
as part of Ghana’s energy mix.  Introduction of thermal plant, however, came at the point 
when its technical, economic and financial feasibility were reliably proven. Therefore, in 
1999 the first phase (330 MW) of the Takoradi Thermal Plant was commissioned and this 
was subsequently upgraded to 550 MW in that same year.  
2.2 Ghana’s Power Sector Reform 
Lack of competiveness, private sector participation coupled with poor financial 
performance of Ghana’s power sector were the driving forces for the reformation of the 
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power sector in the 1990s. According to Opam and Turkson (2000), such factors made 
Ghana’s traditional financiers (e.g., the World Bank) reluctant in providing extra financial 
resources to support the thermal complementary phase of the power sector. The Ghana 
Generation Planning Study (GGPS) of the VRA estimated over US$1.5 billion as the 
amount that was needed to finance infrastructure development at the electricity sector of 
Ghana (ISSER, 2005). This came at the time when the World Bank was unwilling to 
finance non-performing energy sectors in Africa unless issues of transparency, regulation, 
importation of services, commercialisation and corporatisation, commitment lending and 
private investment were met by energy sectors (Amoako-Tuffor and Asamoah, 2015).  
However, the motives for undertaking this reform were not only limited to the financial 
challenges confronting the sector. According to Opam (1995), issues of productivity 
losses of the overall economy as a result of the ineffective operation of the then power 
sector coupled with rapid power interruptions and high cost associated with back-ups 
necessitated the reform. Overwhelming debt burdens, supply-side preferences and 
under-utilised energy conservation practices were other factors that influenced the 
decision to reform Ghana’s power sector (ibid). Increasing efficiency of asset utilisation, 
making necessary policies and institutional changes that will ensure economic equity 
were other supplementary motives for initiating the reform (Sustainable Energy 
Regulation and Policymaking for Africa, nd).  
The Government of Ghana, upon agreeing to the terms and requirements of the World 
Bank contracted SYNEX Consulting Engineers of Chile to provide policy directions that 
could ensure competition and engagement of private investors (Edjekumhene et al., 
2001; Amoako-Tuffor and Asamoah, 2015). In 1994, the firm proposed a new power 
market with policy directions that aimed at meeting the requirements of the World Bank. 
Free entry of private investors in the power generation side as well as decentralisation of 
the distribution arm of the sector; establishment of an Economic Load Dispatch Center 
that will be responsible for planning the operation of the system so as to minimise 
operating costs; existence of different distributors with each operating in a defined 
concession area were some of the policy recommendations by the firm (SYNEX 
Consulting Engineers, 1994 cited in Edjekumhene et al., 2001). 
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Following these policy recommendations, government issued a statement on ‘Power 
Sector Policy’ to serve as a framework that meets the regulatory and transparency 
requirements of the World Bank. This statement also proposed the formation of the Power 
Sector Reform Committee (PSRC) to oversee to the design and implementation of the 
reform (Opam and Turkson, 2000; and Edjekumhene et al., 2001). Obligations such as 
assignment of mandate for power generation, transmission and distribution, promoting 
competitive power market, regulatory framework for prices and tariffs revision, and 
establishment of institutional framework, rested on the shoulders of the PSRC (ibid).  
The PSRC proposed a ‘four-point Action Plan’ to the government of Ghana in 1997 
(Edjekumhene et al., 2001). These were:  
 Introduction of new legislation to establish a new body to replace the then existing 
National Energy Board (NEB) who will introduce explicit regulations, rule of 
practice and standard of performance to governing the power sector; 
 Introduction of ‘open access’ in the power sector to ensure healthy competition; 
 Engineering all stated-owned private utilities into ‘strategic business units’ that can 
help improve accountability and financial management through public-private 
partnerships and joint ventures;    
 Introduction of guidelines and procedures for transparency in tariffs settings. 
According to Edjekumhene et al., (2001) the ‘Four-point Action Plan’ was accepted by 
cabinet, with a few amendments. The proposed establishment of a single regulatory body 
was amended to two, which led to the setting up of the Public Utilities Regulatory 
Commission (PURC) and the Energy Commission (EC). Established by Act 538 in 1997, 
PURC regulates the provision of utility services in the electricity and water sectors in 
Ghana. The EC on the other hand is responsible for the granting of licenses and 
enforcement of compliance with regulations, a duty previously carried out by then NEB. 
These developments attracted the financial supports of the World Bank to build the first 
thermal energy in Ghana (Edjekumhene et al., 2001; Amoako-Tuffor and Asamoah, 
2015). 
The success of the reform was mainly due to the passage of the Statutory Corporations 
(Conversion to Companies) Act 461 in 1993 by Cabinet to encourage private sector 
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participation and investment in about 35 state owned companies, to help improve their 
efficiency, reduce government expenditure and interferences (Opam, 1995). The 
experience sharing and coaching of the SYNEX Consulting firm and the World Bank were 
instrumental as they provided the necessary guide, direction and financial resources for 
the development of the sector (ibid). The power sector reform resulted in benefits such 
as the injection of private sector finance into the sector to uplift the phase of Ghana’s 
power sector, introduction of price competition, creation of enabling environment for 
development of small Independent Renewable Power Generator enterprises to isolated 
rural communities (ibid). 
  
2.3 Level of Engagement of Actors in Ghana’s Energy Reform 
Table 1 presents a summary of contributions through the roles and level of engagements 
by key stakeholders during the reformation phase of Ghana’s Energy Sector.  
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Table 1: Contributions of stakeholders to Ghana’s power sector reform 
Category Stakeholders Contribution 
Donor World Bank  Provision of financial assistance conditioned on meeting certain requirements such 
as debugging VRA, competitiveness promotion of Ghana’s energy sector through 
private investors’ engagement. 
 Sharing of experience and guidelines for the development and adoption of the 
reform. 
Government  Ministry of Mines and 
Energy (MME) 
 They constituted the PSRC and were responsible for overseeing the planning and 
execution of the reform. 
 Recommended Thermal complementation in Ghana’s power system to 
government. 
 Proposed establishment of a separate institution to assume roles of the National 
Energy Board (NEB) and other mandates to improve the power sector. This 
proposal led to the establishment of the Public Utility and Regulatory Commission 
(PURC) and the Energy Commission (EC). 
 Developed a legal framework to help govern the energy sector. 
Volta River Authority 
(VRA) 
Electricity Company of 
Ghana (ECG) 
Parliament of Ghana 
(Legislature)  
 Studied, amended and approved recommendations by the PSRC. 
Government of Ghana 
(Cabinet) 
 Accepted the need for undertaking the reform and also initiated activities leading 
to the attainment of the conditionality of the World Bank. 
 Desired a total reformation of the power sector to free it from government financing 
of the sector. 
NGOs/Civil 
Society Group 
Association of Ghana 
Industries (AGI), Civil 
Servants Association 
(CSA) and Trades 
Union Congress (TUC). 
 Partook in and significantly contributed to the Task Force Committee formed by the 
PSRC in view of helping the design processes and coordination of other aspects 
of the Reformation process. 
 
International 
Bodies 
SYNTEX Consulting 
Engineers (Energy 
Consultant) 
 Engaged by the Government of Ghana to undertake the study that could help meet 
the conditionality of the World Bank. 
 Made recommendations leading to the formation of the PSRC. 
 Recommended thermal complementation for Ghana’s power sector. 
Source: Author’s construct, 2016 
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2.4 Energy Policies in Ghana 
Ghana’s energy policy landscape reveals the country’s readiness for renewable energy 
development, however, there are questions on commitment and implementation of 
policies. Prior to the introduction of the National Energy Policy in 2010, Ghana’s energy 
sector activities were driven by the Strategic National Energy Plan (SNEP) (Energy 
Commission, 2006a; 2010b). The SNEP was subdivided into two main parts: the Energy 
Demand Sectors of the Economy (EDSE) and the Energy Supply Sectors of the Economy 
(ESSE). The latter is further divided into three sections: Electricity/ Power; Petroleum; and 
Woodfuel and Renewable. These strategic documents played crucial roles in shaping the 
energy development of the country.  
The EDSE of the SNEP identifies five energy consumption sectors in Ghana, each with 
outlined strategic plans (Energy Commission, 2006a). Under the residential sector, the 
policy targeted 100 percent electricity coverage of the country by 2020. Rural 
electrification with complementary renewable strategies was targeted at 15 percent by 
2015 and 30 percent by 2020. The commercial and service sector was to experience a 
reduction in energy consumption and woodfuel usage through the introduction of energy 
efficiency programmes and cleaner energy alternatives. The policy targeted 1 percent 
penetration of solar energy utilisation in hotels, restaurants and institutions by 2015 and 
5 percent by 2020. Also targeted was 20 percent utilisation rate of LPG by 2015 under 
the commercial and service sector, with a projected usage rate of 30 percent by 2020. 
Ghana’s agricultural and fisheries energy demand sector is earmarked to be satisfied 
through the increased usage of renewable energy including, solar energy and targeted at 
a penetration rate of 20 percent by 2020. In the transport sector, the plan seeks to reduce 
the dependence on imported fossil fuels and rather encourage fuel efficiency measures. 
The plan also seeks to promote cost effective, but affordable high quality supply systems 
in the industrial sector. Strategies for achieving this goal are silence on the adoption of 
renewable energies but encourage environmental cleanliness practices. 
The ESSE (Electricity) of the SNEP provides policy options and direction for the 
promotion of adequate and reliable electricity to drive economic growth (Energy 
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Commission, 2006b). It identifies three generation options with similar composition of 
renewables, but different compositions of other generation sources:  
 Expansion plan based primarily on natural gas and with renewable energy making 
a 10 percent contribution by installed capacity by 2020. 
 Expansion plan based on natural gas, Bui hydropower project and 10 percent 
renewable energy contribution by installed capacity by 2020.  
 Expansion plan based on natural gas, Bui Hydropower project, nuclear power and 
10 percent renewable energy contribution by installed capacity by 2020.  
These generation options share similar characteristics with slight variations. In option one 
ESSE seeks to: 
1. Establish a 125 MW power barge, which will later be converted into a 187 MW 
combined cycle Gas turbine plant.  
2. Expansion of the 330 MW Tema Gas Thermal Station to 660 MW by 2020.   
3. Establishment of an additional 660 MW Gas thermal Station at Takoradi.   
4. Promote embedded renewables generation (excluding the traditional large hydro 
plants such as Bui), starting with a share of about 5% by 2008 increasing to about 
9% by 2015 and eventually  up to 10% by 2020.  
Contrary to option one, option two has a 330 MW of Gas thermal Station to be constructed 
at Takoradi together with a 200 MW Bui hydro plant to compensate for the reduction in 
option one.  Option three has similar generation mix as option two except for the fact that 
the 330 Gas thermal Station is replaced with a 335 MW nuclear light water reactor. 
Renewable generation remains the same in all three generation options and is proposed 
to come mainly from landfills, wind, solar energy, agro-biofuels and mini-hydro.  
The petroleum sector under the ESSE also has provisions for the promotion of renewable 
energy sources. It promotes renewable energy fuels (gasohol and biodiesel) and natural 
gas to achieve a sustainable supply mix and clean air quality within the sector (Energy 
Commission, 2006c). This is to be achieved through an increase production of: 
 Alcohol for commercial blending of gasohol to complement gasoline use in 
vehicles; 
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 Plant oil such as jathropha oil for commercial blending of biodiesel to complement 
diesel use in vehicles; 
 Liquid biofuels as fuel alternatives. 
In the wood fuel and renewable sub-sector sector, the plan aims at mitigating challenges 
associated with wood fuel through the promotion of alternative fuel usage for domestic 
and commercial activities. On renewables, the plan targets a 10 percent penetration rate 
by 2020 in Ghana’s energy mix through the exploration of technologies such as landfill 
gas to power; waste incineration; wind farms; medium to small scale hydropower plants; 
and solar technologies. To achieve this policy target, strategies such as development of 
regulatory framework that will attract investors and adoption of innovative funding 
mechanisms were outlined in the strategic document (Energy Commission, 2006d).  
Currently, the energy sector activities of the country are shaped by the 2010 National 
Energy Policy, which seeks to develop an energy economy that would guarantee secure 
and reliable supply of high quality energy services for all sectors of the economy and also 
contributes to export earnings (Ministry of Energy, 2010a). It envisages to achieve this 
objective through the implementing of the following strategies:  
 Ensuring energy services are readily available to meet demand at any point in time; 
 Making energy services universally accessible through the development of an 
extensive supply infrastructure; 
 Ensuring that energy is produced and supplied in a form that conforms to 
acceptable international practice with regards to their health and environmental 
impact;  
 Ensuring that energy is used in the most efficient manner; and 
 Ensuring energy is produced and supplied at competitive prices (affordable tariffs). 
The 2010 National Energy Policy covers various sub-sectors, with each having its policy 
goals and strategies (Ministry of Energy, 2010a). Policy directions at the power sub-sector 
aim to provide quality and affordable universal electricity access to all Ghanaians by 2020 
through increasing generation capacities. In respect of the petroleum sub-sector, the 
policy aims to achieve sustainable exploration, production and development of its oil and 
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gas as well as the sustainable management of revenues from the oil and gas extraction. 
On renewables, the policy seeks to increase the share of renewable energy in Ghana’s 
energy mix (10% by 2020) through increasing use of renewable technologies and 
ensuring efficiency in its production and use (Ministry of Energy, 2010a; PAGE, 2015). It 
also seeks to improve production and efficient use of biomass in the short term and the 
promotion of fuel substitution in the medium and long terms.  
The Energy Sector Strategy and Development Plan (ESSDP), a subsidiary instrument of 
the current National Energy Policy, outlines activities, programmes and initiatives towards 
achieving the objectives of the energy policy (Ministry of Energy, 2010b). Strategies 
directed towards developing new renewables include: grid-connected solar PV 
programme for public institutions and estate development by 2013; wind farm project at 
Kpone; Mini Hydro demonstration Project by 2013; Bio-fuels projects by 2010 and 
development of the RE law by 2010 (ibid).  
The Renewable Energy Act (Act 832) was passed in 2011 to provide the necessary 
legislative support and framework needed to achieve the renewable policy target. 
Enshrined in the Act are the establishment of RE fund, Feed-in-Tariff (FiT), mini-grid and 
other initiatives necessary for the attraction of private investors to develop the sector. 
According to PAGE (2015), despite such initiatives to develop the renewable sector, 
issues of long delay in setting up the RE fund to finance RET developments and the Net-
Metering system are hindering the development of RE in the country.   
As revealed in the energy policy landscape of Ghana, policy directions and strategies 
aimed at developing the renewable energy sector are ubiquitous. Under the SNEP, 
strategic elements that seek to develop the renewable sector are covered for all sectors. 
The current Renewable Energy Act (Act 832), FiT and renewable energy funds are 
initiatives under the SNEP (Energy Commission 2006d; GoG, 2011). Despite the 
progress, however, the present share of renewables in the energy generation mix is not 
abysmal (Energy Commission, 2015; PAGE, 2015).  
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2.5 Institutional Environment of Ghana’s Energy Sector 
Several institutions play key roles in the development of Ghana’s power sector. From the 
ministry responsible for the sector, Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (MoEP), through to 
the regulatory institutions like the EC and other national, international and non-
governmental organisations, all of which support policies, strategies, programmes, 
regulations and projects that are directed at the effective running and development of the 
sector. Other institutions have played key roles that serve as checks and balances on 
other sector players to ensure transparency, efficiency, optimality and accountability in 
the sector.  The Millennium Development Authority (MiDA) has attributed the recent 
power challenges in the power supply value chain in Ghana to poor distribution. 
Accordingly, the ECG, NEDCO and Enclave Power, which are the power distribution 
companies in Ghana are the weakest link within the power supply chain. At the backdrop 
of this, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact II signed between the 
Government of Ghana and the United States of America’s government proposed that the 
ECG be released on concession for about 25 years. MiDA views this move as the best 
remedy to attack the root causes of the challenges faced by the power sector. Details of 
the mandates of relevant stakeholders and their contributions to Ghana’s power sector 
are summarised in Table 2.  
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Table 2: Mandates and Contributions of Key Energy Players in Ghana’s Energy Sector  
Actor Institution Mandate Contribution 
 Ministry of Energy 
and Petroleum 
(MoEP) 
 Enactment of policies and facilitates 
implementation of energy strategies, 
programmes and projects within the 
energy sector.  
 Development Ghana Energy Policy, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Local Institutions 
Energy Commission 
of Ghana (EC) 
 Regulation, management, 
development and utilisation of energy 
resources in Ghana. 
 Granting of energy licenses and permits to both 
domestic and foreign investors for the 
development of the energy sector. 
 Promotion of Efficiency Management System for 
utility providers, households and industries 
through its energy efficiency programmes. 
 Development of the Renewable Energy Act to 
encourage investments in the RE sector in the 
country. 
Volta River Authority 
(VRA) 
 Prior to 2005, VRA mandate lies in 
power generation, transmission and 
distribution. 
 In 2005, transmission mandate was 
given out to Ghana Grid Company 
(GRIDCo).  
 Distribution also given out to the 
NEDCo (a subsidiary of VRA) 
 Responsible for generation roles. 
 Generator of electricity and also responsible for 
the management of state power stations such as 
Akosombo and Kpong Power Stations. 
 Had membership in the ‘PSRC’ that was tasked 
to initiate and coordinate the reformation system 
that led into the current thermal complementation 
phase of electricity generation. 
 In recent years, has introduced new renewable 
(VRA Solar of 2.5 MW) to Ghana’s energy 
generation. 
  
Electricity Company 
of Ghana (ECG) 
 Distribution and supply of electricity 
to industries, bulk consumers and 
domestic consumers within the 
southern sector of Ghana. 
 Until 1987, the ECG was responsible for 
distribution and supply of power across the 
country. 
 
Public Utility 
Regulatory 
 Mandated to regulate the energy and 
water sectors to ensure consumers 
 Played supportive role in the development and 
implementation of the Feed-in-Tariff and 
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Commission of 
Ghana (PURC) 
and producers satisfaction through 
tariff setting. 
Automatic adjustment formula schemes for 
billing.  
Ghana Grid 
Company Limited 
 Grid infrastructure management to 
ensure effective transmittion of 
electricity. 
 Provision and extension of the grid infrastructure 
to cities, towns, villages and remote areas for 
electrification purposes. 
 Ministry of 
Environment, 
Science, Technology 
and Innovation 
(MESTI) 
 Integrates environmental issues, 
sustainable management of human 
settlements into energy 
developments. 
 Environmental certifications to investors before 
energy licenses are issued for development of 
energy projects. It does this through its agency 
‘Environmental Protection Agency’  
Non-
governmental/Civil 
Society 
organisations 
Trade Union 
Congress (TUC) 
 It is the mouthpiece of all workers 
union in Ghana and deals with 
government and employment 
associations to promote the 
wellbeing of all employees. 
 Shapes energy policies especially on tariff 
settings through advocacies - strikes, protest, and 
social agitation. Evident is the 1997 protest 
against tariff increment. 
Association of Ghana 
Industries (AGI) 
 It is the mouthpiece of industries in 
Ghana (small, medium and large). It 
advocates policies for their growth 
and development.  
International 
Organisations  
World Bank  Supporting the scaling up of 
generation capacities; and improving 
efficiency and governance of energy 
sectors especially those owned by 
African states.  
 Key financier of Ghana’s energy sector. 
  
 Initiated the major power reform leading to the 
debugging of some mandates of the VRA.  
MiDA  Support the transformation of 
Ghana’s power sector and stimulate 
private investment 
 Addressing the constraints to the supply of 
adequate and reliable power 
Source: Author’s construct, 2016  
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3. APPROACHES TO THE PEA STUDY   
3.1 Methodology  
The approach used to undertake this PEA study is informed by Political Economy 
Analysis of Climate Change Policies (PEACH) Methodology by Schmitz (2012) and the 
PEA Framework by Barnett et al., (2016). The PEACH methodology focuses on 
answering the central question: who drives/obstructs certain policies? According to 
Schmitz (2012), an application of the PEA in climate change issues should be able to 
bring out relevant sector players who by their actions and policy priorities promote or 
obstruct such initiatives. Accordingly, a PEA should be capable of setting out the key 
challenges of which the study intends to investigate such as ‘who drives/obstructs climate 
change policies in the rising powers’ (Schmitz, 2012:1). It examines the complexities 
(actors, institutions and motivations) and is based on identifying the various stakeholders 
involved, including their diverse priorities. This therefore demands the mapping of 
identified stakeholders in a power priority matrix according to their direct and indirect 
influence on policymaking and implementation, and analysing their competing narratives. 
Using narratives from in-depth interviews of sector players, the PEA analysis through the 
PEACH’ lens embodies four parts: mapping stakeholders according to priority; 
discussions on the proponents and opponents of policies; mapping the level of influence 
of stakeholders on such policies; and identification of coalitions for change (Schmitz, 
2012). 
On the other hand, the PEA Framework developed by Barnett et al., (2016) to understand 
issues of poor performance of Africa’s power sector despite several years of donor 
supports encompasses a four stage process: Problem identification; Diagnosis; 
Prognosis; and Interventions (Table 3). The problem identification stage is in synchrony 
with Schmitz’s (2012) position of ‘setting out the key challenge’ from the onset. 
Unreliability of service provision and incapability of the power sector to meet both existing 
and potential demand due to its financial unsustainability emerged as the key challenge 
of the power sector in Africa, which was the key focus of Barnett et al., (2016). The 
diagnosis phase seeks to unravel features within the political and economy landscape 
accounting for the persistence of the problem. In their study, issues such as poor 
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investment in the sector was as a result of the risky investment environment of the sector; 
monopoly in the power sector; logistical challenge; unsustainable policy environment and 
ad hoc political interferences; politics and corruption were diagnosed as the factors 
causing the abysmal performance of Africa’s power sector. The Prognosis stage builds 
upon the diagnosed stage, as it brings out all potential forms of change, and the most 
likely pathways of change. The intervention stage solicits solutions to the challenge by 
identifying what can be done differently to improve the situation in the power sector. This 
stage entails the identification of factors capable of changing the status quo to promote 
desirable results to enhance the development of the sector. 
 
Table 3: PEA Framework 
1. Problem identification  E.g. poor performance in the power sector  
2. Diagnosis  What features of the political economy 
generate and contribute to the persistence 
of the problem?  
3. Prognosis  Given the diagnosis, what is the potential 
for change, and what are the mostly likely 
pathways of change?  
4. Interventions  How can particular actors help to shift the 
pattern of incentives in a manner that 
promotes desirable change? 
Source: Barnett et al., (2016) 
The methodology for this current study is therefore, a hybrid of the PEACH methodology 
(Schmitz, 2012) and Barnett et al.’s (2016) PEA framework – an adoption of elements 
from both approaches that are deemed pertinent. Thus, key elements including problem 
identification (already captured in the introduction section as low investment in renewable 
energy sector in Ghana); diagnosis (identification of binding constraints to renewable 
energy investments); prognosis (mapping of promising policies); mapping of stakeholders 
(See Appendix 2) to ascertain the varied narratives; and coalition for change (intervention 
stage) constitute the analytical framework for this study.  
3.2 Identification of Binding Constraints 
Identification of binding constraints to renewable energy investment is crucial for the 
present PEA. The Green Growth Diagnostic Study for Africa (GGDA), of which this report 
is a component, adopts qualitative and quantitative approaches to unearth factors 
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hindering investment in renewable energy in the midst of their proven economic and 
financial viabilities. Underpinned by the Growth Diagnostic methodology, a well-
structured diagnostic framework for renewable energy investment was developed and 
applied to identify the binding constraints in Kenya and Ghana. The framework covers 
scientific diagnostic mechanism where generic constraints were further diagnosed for 
specific constraints. Issues of uncompetitive returns, unsustainable returns, inequitable 
costs and benefits, high business costs, lack of domestic institutions to supply long-term 
finance, lack of long term external capital, forex exchange risk and political risk were 
identified as factors responsible for the present low investment in renewables energies in 
Africa (Pueyo et al., 2015). 
Using two main methodological approaches, review of literature and in-depth interviews 
of experts, potential constraints to RE investments in Ghana were identified. Evidence 
emerging from the study points to the fact that clean technologies were considered to be 
unattractive. Investments in RE had low returns in comparison to alternatives, high 
financial costs and high return expectations. The current low development of Ghana’s RE 
sector is predominantly hinged on the high risk nature of regulations at the power sector. 
High transaction cost of permitting procedures, low credit worthiness of the off-taker, low 
capabilities and industrial development and a highly volatile currency and inflation make 
investment in RE very risky and uncertain. Other revealed constraints include lack of 
access to domestic savings, high interest charges by banks, and short payback periods 
of credit facilities that dissuade potential investors from investing in the sector. Figure 1 
presents an overview of the potential constraints facing RE investment in Ghana. 
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Figure 1: Constraints to renewable energy investment in Ghana 
 
 
Source: Pueyo (2016) 
 
In an attempt to understand the gravity of the constraints to investment in REs, in-depth 
interviews of experts (See Appendix 1) were conducted and stakeholders were asked to 
prioritise constraints.2 These were further subjected to a diagnostic testing by the HRV 
framework to prove how binding the constraints are on RE investments (Pueyo, 2016). 
Per the HRV framework, for a constraint to be binding, it must have the following 
attributes: a high shadow price; high impact on renewable energy investment when they 
are released; agents would try to bypass them; and agents less intensive in the constraint 
would be more likely to survive and thrive (Hausmann et al., 2008). Faulty power sector 
regulation, off-taker risk, lack of access to appropriate finance and lack of political will 
were prioritised highly by experts as the binding constraints in Ghana (Pueyo, 2016). 
Upon applying the HRV framework, however, faulty power regulation, off-taker risk and 
lack of appropriate finance at the domestic market emerged as the most binding 
constraints to RE investment in Ghana. 
 
                                                          
2 List of experts for the in-depth interviews on constraints facing RE investment is presented in Appendix 1.  
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3.3 Mapping of Recommended Potential Policies  
Methodologically, the next step in this PEA study is the mapping of relevant policies that 
are potent enough to help unlock the above identified binding constraints. Potentials to 
overcome the binding constraints to RE investment in Ghana exist, but lack of enactment 
and implementation have saddled them. Table 4 contains the mapped existing policies 
having the potentials to unlock the binding constraints surrounding RE investment in 
Ghana and, answers as to why they are not adopted or implemented form the core of the 
discussion in the subsequent sub-sections of this report.  
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Table 4: Potential policies to address binding constraints to RE investment in Ghana  
Constraint Policy Expected Outcome 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Off-Taker Risk 
Privatisation of the revenue arm of the 
power sector.  
 Achieving an efficient and effective revenue collection system.  
 Encouraging private sector participation through the provision of a 
reliable repayment mechanism to power producers.  
Improved management of ECG including 
revenue collection (especially revenue 
from debtors – government and others)  
 Alternative to privatisation but entails adopting effective 
management practices, which improves overall performance of the 
off-taker. 
Promotion of efficient technical practices 
within the distribution arm of the power 
sector through privatisation. 
 Reduction in distribution losses, particularly non-technical losses. 
Establishment of a competitive off-taker 
market in the power sector.  
 Encouraging other mandated institutions such as mining 
companies, bulk power producers and VRA to sign off-taker 
agreements in other to promote competition. 
Faulty power 
sector regulation 
Establish a full-time high level IPP 
facilitator in the power sector. 
 Promotion of competitive solicitation and contracting process that is 
based on standardised terms, including payment risk mitigation.  
 Encouraging transparent auctioning systems instead of a system 
based on unsolicited proposals with projects that may forever stay 
in the pipeline. 
Establishment of a reliable and 
transparent full-cost tariff pricing system 
 
 Ensuring that the automatic price adjustment formula takes into 
consideration several indicators such as the environmental cost in 
order to be cost reflective.  
Full Implementation of the RE-Act (Act 
832) and its enshrined subsidiary 
instruments (Net-metering, mini-grid 
systems, and the RE fund and levies) 
 To guide and track progress of RE development in the power sector 
Lack of access to 
appropriate 
finance 
Establishment of RE financial instruments 
within domestic banks by Government 
with lower interest rates 
 Opportunity to offer lower interest charges on loans and to offer long 
term finance to investors 
Source: Author’s compilation from literature sources (Off-taker (USAID, 2014; IFC, 2014; World Bank, 2013); Regulation 
(World Bank, 2013); Finance (World Bank, 2013)) 
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4. DISCUSSION OF BINDING CONSTRAINTS TO RE INVESTMENTS IN GHANA VIA 
PEA 
Having identified policies with potentials to address the binding constraints to RE 
investment in Ghana, it is imperative to understand why such policies have been 
ineffectual in the past hitherto, through the adapted PEA methodology. Through in-depth 
interviews with key stakeholders, the various discourses accounting for the ineffectuality 
of the policies with potentials to unlock the different binding constraints to RE investment, 
are teased out. The proponents and opponents of these policies are identified via the 
different narratives. For each of the potential policies, an account of the gains that could 
emanate from their implementation are outlined with their proponents, prior to the 
discussion on why they have not been promoted. 
4.1 Off-Taker Risk Constraint 
The non-existence of a credible off-taker in Ghana’s power sector remains a key 
disincentive to investment in energy especially, renewables. The inability of the present 
off-taker (ECG) to maintain a credible and resounding financial balance sheet as a result 
of low electricity prices and bottlenecks with revenue collection underscores the risk in 
the power sector as far as investment is concerned. This situation therefore dampens 
investors’ confidence since it could be difficult for them to recoup their investments. 
Narratives from stakeholders underpinning why the credit unworthiness of the present off-
taker dissuades investors from investing in Ghana’s power sector are in tandem with 
findings by the African Energy Issue (2014). 
‘An important constraint is that the off-taker is not financially credible. They are 
unable to pay their bills’ (Head, Renewable Energy Promotion, Energy 
Commission (EC)). 
‘When you generate power it’s either ECG or NEDCo that will sell the power and 
they have proven not to be credible. When they buy power, they don’t pay back, 
so it becomes a disincentive for investors’ (Deputy Executive Director, African 
Center of Energy Policy (ACEP). 
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‘We can’t call ECG a credible off-taker. So now, it is a major bottleneck … who 
would buy the power I’m generating and can pay at the end of the month? Most of 
the people who have gotten PPA’s from ECG are asking for further guarantees 
because of their notorious track record of being unable to pay’ (Executive Director, 
KITE). 
4.1.1 Privatisation of the revenue arm of the power sector 
One of the key policy interventions or initiatives with the potentials to help unlock the off-
taker risk in the power sector is the privatisation of the revenue arm of the power sector. 
The ability to create a competitive retail market in Ghana’s power sector, in which the 
current monopolistic role of the ECG becomes defunct is expected to be derived from the 
implementation of this policy instrument. The competitive retail market will seek to 
strengthen the revenue collection base of the off-taker, since it will involve the adoption 
of innovative and efficient monitoring and metering systems. According to Eberhard et al., 
(2008), the introduction of these innovative mechanisms by the private entity will improve 
the system than under the management of a public body. Thus, the enactment of such a 
policy instrument could lead to high level of performances and efficiency in the revenue 
mobilisation within the organisation. According to some of the stakeholders interviewed; 
 
 ‘The way things are being looked at is that we want to have a retail market where 
interested companies will be given a concession once they meet the requirement. 
So you take electricity and sell in your concession area’ (Head, Renewable Energy 
Promotion, Energy Commission). 
 ‘In Ghana, we used to be vertically integrated and then we went through reform, 
broke it up into generation, transmission and distribution. Currently, distribution 
does two things. We do distribution and we do supply. Typically, you may want to 
separate the two functions and then for example open the supply phase up for 
competition’ (General Manager of Regulation, Electricity Company of Ghana). 
 ‘So looking first at privatising the revenue arm of the power sector, ECG in a way 
says that in terms of distributing bills, it was the private sector. So they were 
involving the private sector in a way in terms of distributing bills but I think when 
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payment had to be made it had to be made directly to the ECG. So it was 
something [ECG] like working with them [private sector players] at least to 
distribute bills. So in a way they are doing it… [Now] what the COMPACT seeks to 
do is just to go beyond’ (Millennium Development Authority (MiDA) Team).  
‘The idea is that bringing in privatisation will lead to competition … But if we are 
bringing in a privatisation which means that it is going to be competitive, then you 
are bringing in about three or two companies. Then for me to make money, I 
need to get more customers onto my system. How do I do that? I do that by 
improving my system of energy production, distribution and effective private 
system to outwit my competitor’. (Coordinator, KASA-Ghana). 
A boost in investment is another benefit expected to be realised if the policy instrument 
is implemented because of the infusion of the state-of-the-art innovative mechanisms in 
business activities by the private entity. The ability to influence capital inflow for 
investment is expected to be undertaken efficiently by a private entity than a public entity 
whose source of funds is dependent on government. This has the potential of eliminating 
all forms of subventions from government in the sector, which in most cases are the 
reasons for government interference in the power sector (World Bank, 2004). Anwader 
and Ozuna (2002) note that government interference is the core reason for inefficiency in 
the power sectors in developing countries. Hence, the involvement of the private sector 
will attract more investment and further relieves government from budget constraints 
(ibid).  Views from the in-depth interviews supporting the outlined gains are below: 
‘No matter who is in power, so long as they have the opportunity to influence, the 
temptation is there. So with the private sector governance, it reduces interference 
in terms of procurements and other things… So we will be making investments on 
how to modernise, how to make it even easier to capture customers, how to make 
it easier to detect faults and how to make it easier to fix faults so that we can 
improve on the service delivery’ (MiDA Team). 
‘There are other competing needs. Where we can get the private sector to do 
things, let them do it so that we can concentrate on other important things’ (MiDA 
Team).  
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‘Government is saying that, oh, we don’t want to pour money down the drain. This 
is what we want to do, which is fair from the government’s point of view’ (Chief 
Executive Officer, Solar Light Ghana). 
 
 
 
4.1.1.1 Fear of High Tariff  
Electricity tariffs play critical role in political discourse in most jurisdictions of Africa and, 
Ghana is not an exception. The level of electricity prices influence consumers’ perception 
about government policies and the energy sector is used as a platform by political leaders 
to canvass for political support (Oda and Tsujita, 2010). Politicians adopt cross-subsidies 
and life-line tariff structures to make electricity affordable and eliminate social protest 
(Fattouh and El-Katiri, 2015). Until recently, electricity tariffs were not cost reflective in 
Ghana due to political interference. Hence, any initiative at making tariff cost reflective 
mostly encounters series of social protest and political interventions in the operations of 
the energy sector.3 
‘I think the country is trying at this point to ensure that we pass on the full cost. The 
tariff that we are paying now, I think that even if we guaranteed a private sector 
that tariff, they would want to generate electricity’ (Deputy Executive Director, 
African Center of Energy Policy). 
One of the main reasons going against the privatisation of the revenue arm of ECG, 
however, is the fear of increase in tariffs. According to Hall et al., (2005) initiatives towards 
privatisation of essential national assets such as the energy sector are never without 
oppositions, for the fear of price increment. Privatisation in most cases widens the 
affordability gap of the population who cannot afford services from assets that used to be 
provided by the public institutions (ibid). Hall et al., (2005) and Nellis (2003) dwelling on 
the negative implication associated with privatisation, note that it mostly distorts 
socioeconomic conditions in an economy through deepening poverty and increases the 
cost of living. Such fears by citizenry have negative effects on governance due to the 
                                                          
3 http://www.africanews.com/2016/01/20/ghana-labour-groups-protest-increase-in-utility-and-taxes/ 
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‘patron-client relationship’ practices in developing countries in which there is a trade 
market for cost of electricity and votes (Barnett et al., 2016). Indeed, narratives from the 
in-depth interviews attest to the fact that the fear of increase in tariff and the implications 
upon privatisation serve as important obstructing elements of the non-implementation of 
the policy instrument. 
‘I think the stakeholders that are kicking against this are basically the final 
consumers who in effect have witnessed tremendous increase in electricity tariffs. 
The fact is you are bringing a third party, which we see will be more efficient and 
more effective. The fact too, however, is that we also have information about the 
cost of electricity being higher than how much we are paying and it means  that a 
third party who is coming in with a business motive or private motive will need to 
break even or make profit for that matter through high cost of electricity tariffs. So, 
consumers would then try to fight against those things’ (Coordinator, KASA-
Ghana). 
‘…Well, I think when you talk about privatisation, people think that prices are going 
to go high. With the telecoms too that was the fear, but when the privatisation 
happened, prices never went up as initially thought…’ (Head, Renewable Energy 
Promotion, Energy Commission). 
However, other stakeholders object to connoting privatisation with increment in tariffs. 
‘The other argument is also that tariffs will go up with privatisation. This doesn’t 
happen anywhere. Even in the advanced countries, tariffs are not fixed by the 
operator. That is why we have PURC, they are independent and take certain thing 
into consideration before bringing the tariff. So the argument that certain prices will 
go up because a concessionaire is coming in is not so’ (MiDA Team). 
4.1.1.2 Ideological perspectives of ECG as a national identity 
The belief that ECG is a national asset and should stay as such also emerged strongly 
as a reason against privatisation. People with this perception opine that government has 
no moral right to either sell or give out ECG’s function to a foreign private entity since that 
will be tantamount to weakening the country’s sovereignty. Once such a national asset is 
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given out to a private sector player, it will no longer be used to serve the interest of the 
public, which in turn can affect the economic wellbeing of the vulnerable (Buresch, 2003). 
Views from the in-depth interviews and literature sources manifesting the ideological 
arguments against privatisation are below.  
‘This agitation issue is about people who encourage socialism, they think this is a 
state asset but I don’t have any problem when the state asset is working. Some 
people think that it is better to have monopoly in the public sector rather than the 
private sector because they still see it as a public asset. That is why people are 
agitating. And then they come and take control, they would send the money 
outside. They still think if government paid all that it owns ECG then, ECG can be 
on its own. The government doesn’t have the money to pay ECG. So then the 
status quo just continues’ (MiDA Team).  
‘Looking at what is happening and the attempt by government through MiDA to 
give ECG to a company to manage as a concession for 25 years, it’s on a large 
scale and taking it from the hands of Ghanaians to a foreign company. So the issue 
about privatisation is not new for me, but it is the magnitude and the sort of 
independence given to the third party to do those collections is what is new.’ 
(Coordinator, KASA-Ghana).  
‘They are also saying that the concessions or the kind of room we want to give to 
the private entity if we gave the same room to the Ghanaians, they can deliver. I 
think that is why people are also listening to them’ (Deputy Executive Director, 
ACEP). 
‘Ownership should be Ghanaian. It should be listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange 
so that every Ghanaian will be a shareholder. In that way, it will still be for 
Ghanaians but it will mean government cannot take out anything from the ECG.’4 
(Chief Policy Analyst, GIPPO). 
                                                          
4 http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/Tarzan-disagrees-with-ECG-workers-over-privatisation-
465173 (Accessed; 15/8/2016). 
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Others, however, argue that the privatisation in the case of the MiDA Compact II will not 
mean the entire ECG will be given out to a private entity.  
‘Ownership of the company (ECG) still stays with government of Ghana. The 
negotiations are going on between an operator for ownership of the wires and assets 
within the concession period. By doing so, if you are operating an asset, we (ECG) 
still have to have control over those assets’ (General Manager, Electricity Company 
of Ghana).   
‘So ECG will still be there but it will be a whole new company who owns the assets 
within the concession period. They grant them the access and enter into an 
agreement on how they are supposed to operate’ (MiDA Team).  
 
4.1.1.3 Foreign/Externally driven agenda  
External influence in the policy agenda has emerged strongly in privatisation processes 
in developing countries (Haque, 2000). According to Jiyad (1995), the ineffectiveness of 
various sectors including energy due to state interference and poor financial management 
has made donor organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank to demand performance indicators that will address public sector 
inefficiencies, reduction of state intervention, and privatisation of public enterprises as 
conditions for financial support. The ineffectiveness of these sectors therefore creates an 
avenue for such donors to influence the decision making process and further impose 
recommendations from other jurisdictions that sometimes fail to reflect the core needs of 
that country (Adam et al., 1992).   
Opponents of the current drive to privatise the revenue arm of ECG through the MiDA 
Compact II opine that the process is heavily influenced by external players and not coming 
from within the country. Accordingly, the Government of Ghana failed to incorporate 
processes in the MiDA Compact II to reflect the country’s needs before beginning the 
agreement. Against this backdrop, opponents of the privatisation of the revenue arm of 
ECG through the MiDA Compact II view the entire process as highly influenced by the 
donors, leading into agreements that do not only fail to address the core problem about 
the off-taker market, but rather have adverse effects on workers of the ECG and final 
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consumers. The narratives below add weight to the critical role of the external 
stakeholders being drivers of the privatisation vis-à-vis other national stakeholders 
vehemently opposing it. 
 ‘It’s an external pressure and you see how we respond to external pressure … 
When something is coming from outside we are going to push back easily, good 
or not. So what would have been nice is that we ourselves recognise that the way 
we run these parastatals over the years has been wrong’ (Chief Executive Officer, 
Solar Light Ghana).  
 ‘I think that government should have even commissioned its own research into 
this and not to sit down for International Finance Corporation (IFC) to come and 
do that for us’ (Deputy Executive Director, ACEP).  
  ‘So we are in a geopolitical environment, you are looking to gain access to markets 
and influence over policy…If they (external powers) are going to gain favour in 
Ghana and be able to push their policies in Ghana…it’s fine’ (Chief Executive 
Officer, Solar Light Ghana).  
 ‘Some people ask this question - how will Americans put in this money if they have 
no interest?  They think it’s a way of the Americans taking hold of our power sector’ 
(MiDA Team).  
‘So the external pressure from my perspective is because there might be some 
under dealings somewhere which I might not be able to tell. Because I don’t see 
the rationale behind it, if I am going to use your own money to run your system. 
Or, because of government’s inability to trust the ECG’s system so we think the 
third party can do an efficient and effective job’ (Coordinator, KASA-Ghana). 
‘This policy is not the best option to bring reforms to make ECG more efficient and 
profitable. We have already articulated our views and suggestion in our position 
paper to MiDA and the Ministry of Power. Unfortunately, the government of Ghana 
with tacit pressure from MCC of the United States of America, is still pushing this 
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agenda despite all the negative implications for our country and its citizens.’5 
(Public Utility Workers Union, Electricity Company of Ghana). 
‘There are capable Ghanaians who can manage this company. We don’t want 
foreigners. Our problem now is with the invisible hands; there is a lot of interference 
from external sources in our operations as a company, …We don’t understand why 
we started a two-year strategic business unit in the Ashanti Region on a pilot basis, 
to be replicated in other regions based on its success, and just six months into the 
initiative, the government wants to hand over the company to foreign investors 
without waiting for a proper assessment of the initiative’( National Secretary of the 
Senior Staff Union of the ECG).6 
4.1.1.4 Job uncertainty 
Concerns about job security and the possible creation of jobs for only the few elites are 
arguments against the policy instrument of privatising the revenue arm of ECG. While 
assurance has been given in the MiDA Compact II deal that no ECG worker will be laid 
off in the first 57 years of the concession, opponents of the initiative including, ECG 
workers are not entirely convinced about the provision especially, they are unsure of their 
retentions after the first 5 years. This uncertainty has triggered series of strike actions 
(see Figure 2) by ECG workers against Government.8 The following views from 
stakeholders attest to the fear of job losses if the policy is implemented: 
‘Everywhere you want to introduce change there is opposition. When we meet 
ECG and we talk, we say we understand because nobody wants it. You know what 
the situation is but then we are not sure about what happens tomorrow’ (MiDA 
Team).  
                                                          
5 http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/PUWU-to-stage-3-day-demo-over-ECG-privatisation-
464641  (Accessed; 15/8/2016). 
6 http://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/ecg-workers-in-accra-oda-protest-against-privatisation-of-
company.html (Accessed; 15/8/2016). 
7 ‘For the first five years we are telling whoever comes as a concessionaire that you cannot reduce the level of 
employment within ECG. It is a way of guaranteeing people’s jobs at least for the next five years’ (Chief Executive 
Officer, Millennium Development Authority). 
8 http://www.africanews.com/2016/01/20/ghana-labour-groups-protest-increase-in-utility-and-taxes/ (Accessed: 
15/8/2016). 
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‘They [ECG workers] are making an argument that this whole restructuring is being 
piloted in Kumasi, so why the rush to sell or privatise the whole of ECG. Those are 
legitimate concerns because they are afraid of job securities and are not sure what 
the private entity would do’ (Deputy Executive Director, ACEP).  
‘I think it’s really job security, first of all. Maybe pride a little bit, but job security and 
mistrust of whoever is coming in, that, they are simply coming to make money on 
top of their labour’ (Chief Executive Officer, Solar Light Ghana).  
Buttressing this resistance from the ECG workers’ union are evidences from similar 
privatisation agenda implemented elsewhere in the world. Birdsall and Nellis (2003) 
observed that privatisation unfairly disenfranchise workers as in most cases they throw 
people out of good jobs, making them unemployed, poorer and further leaving them in 
states of emotional instability due to their inability to easily overcome the shocks 
emanating from the job losses. Workers who are fortunate to return to the labour market 
usually have to work for lengthy hours to earn decent salaries or suffer from marginal 
reductions in benefits (Birdsall and Nellis, 2003).  
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Figure 2: ECG’s workers demonstrate against privatisation9  
 
 
4.1.1.5 Lack of broader consultation  
The lack of broader consultation is another fundamental reason that fuels agitation, 
opposition and disbelief in privatisation and the MiDA Compact II agreement for the 
privatisation of the revenue arm of ECG is no exception. The consultation process as has 
been argued, appears to have taken place without the involvement of all key stakeholders 
in the energy sector or, decisions have been taken by authorities without all stakeholders 
reaching a common consensus.  
‘…why really government chose concession nobody knows… that hasn’t been 
made public to us either. It was solely based on the conclusions of IFC or 
government has further details that we don’t know. If you ask government you are 
told they are working with ECG management. Who are the ECG management? 
The ECG management is government, so if government appoints the key persons 
in ECG and they are part of the negotiation to privatise ECG, then it is government 
negotiating everything. So the workers themselves at ECG were not deeply 
involved in the decision. That is where government erred in not trying to get 
everybody involved’ (Deputy Executive Director, ACEP). 
                                                          
9 http://www.myjoyonline.com/news/2016/June-23rd/ecg-workers-demonstrate-against-planned-
privatisation.php (Accessed: 15/8/2016). 
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The lack of broader consultation has therefore led to information asymmetry surrounding 
the process of privatising the revenue arm of ECG through the MiDA Compact II. This 
has seriously overshadowed the intents of this policy instrument as it has opened room 
for diverse interpretations by different stakeholders.  
‘I’m sure the news is out there, half information and people adding their own stuff… 
Maybe, people are not well informed. They don’t know what is happening. For me, 
I always use the example of the telecom. I feel that is the model that we have to 
use.’ (Head, Renewable Energy Promotion, Energy Commission).  
‘As we speak civil societies and industry watchers don’t know the details about this 
whole process…we don’t know what is being negotiated and what the terms of 
reference would be. It has been a secret document in cabinet. It has not been 
released and citizens have to make inputs into the terms of reference even if we 
have to give it out as a concession. That process has to be transparent and it hasn’t 
been. It is difficult for anybody to jump to the side of government or to jump to the 
side of workers when the full details are not known’ (Deputy Executive Director, 
ACEP).  
‘…the kind of comment that they have made so far and the kind of threat elements, 
it means we are getting into a confrontational stage which is not the best for all of 
us. You said you won’t sell, now you are selling, the terms and conditions under 
which you are dolling out this particular transaction, Ghanaians need to know and 
this is what Public Utilities Workers Union (PUWU) is saying government should 
stay away from ECG or explain to us.’10 (General Secretary, Industrial and 
Commercial Workers Union) 
According to Barnett et al., (2016) dissatisfaction of this kind makes citizenry lose trust in 
government policy and, that has a knock-on effect on their political fortunes.  
                                                          
10 http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/ICU-backs-protest-against-ECG-privatisation-465398 
(Accessed; 15/8/2016). 
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4.1.2 Improved management of ECG  
Another intervention that could have helped unlock the low investment in renewable 
energy in Ghana is the improved management of ECG including, efficient revenue 
collection from debtors – government and others. Proponents of this intervention deem it 
more promising than privatisation. Authors (Hall et al., 2005; Barnett et al., 2016) ague 
that issues related to privatisation of the energy sector in Africa are attributed to avoidable 
inefficiencies that arise from governments’ interferences. The implementation of this 
improved management intervention is envisaged to enhance efficiency in the power 
sector. Williamson (1985) argues that if government replicates the strategies employed 
by the private sector and organises the energy sector in a similar fashion, with more 
stringent controls, it will yield the same efficiency results and attract more investment than 
what privatisation may achieve. An effective implementation of this intervention could help 
establish the right structures to run the off-taking market. Structures such as effective 
management system, monitoring and detecting systems, controls systems and 
elimination of government interferences are expected to be realised with the proper 
implementation of this policy intervention. Narratives from stakeholders in support of this 
policy intervention are captured below 
‘Improved management, or let’s say, management autonomy. To me those are key 
and privatisation helps us achieve that, but the solution is not the privatisation. It 
is actually the management and efficiency within the organisation that privatisation 
has enabled. Now, why can’t Ghanaians be disciplined enough to do those things 
themselves? That has been the argument of the workers, which I agree with 
completely’ (Chief Executive Officer, Solar Light Ghana). 
‘Privatisation doesn’t always mean bringing in external people to help. Even well 
doing companies go on privatisation even when somebody has put in money and 
the company is working. Example is Tullow has the capacity to source any funding, 
but looking at the financial status, performance and whatever reason decided to 
sell shares. They listed on the Ghana stock exchange to raise more money to do 
its operations. So in that sense, the control and decision making process of the 
company is being done by the shareholders. That is the sort of privatisation KASA 
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will back and the sort of privatisation we will recommend. There should be 
technological innovations to be more effective and we can also do the listing of 
ECG on the stock for Ghanaians to buy into it and take decisions.’ (Coordinator, 
KASA-Ghana). 
‘We are actually for the restructuring of the system whether it is privatisation or 
trying to put in place the right mechanism to make sure that ECG works. We will 
be for it because we know what the challenges and whether you want to make 
ECG more autonomous to take independent decisions or not…Yes, I think the 
conclusion we (NGOs) have come to is that we want an efficient ECG’ (Deputy 
Executive Director, ACEP). 
‘So again, these (privatisation and improve management) are all ingredients and 
I’m sure you are aware of that, but not one of them is the solution. It’s the 
combination of them, the solution that will solve it. But let’s stay on the first one, 
privatisaton? Yes, it will reduce some risk, but I think a deeper problem there is 
really the balance sheet of the off-taker. Will the privatisation improve the balance 
sheet? Probably and possibly. But to me, the underlying cause is the balance sheet 
and the freedom of management to preserve that balance sheet’ (Chief Executive 
Officer, Solar Light Ghana). 
4.1.2.1 Powerlessness of government to resist external pressure associated with 
financial assistance  
While improved management of ECG will help enhance RE energy investment in the 
country, one of the key factors militating against its implementation is the weakness of 
the Government to resist external pressures associated with financial assistance. In most 
developing countries with Ghana not being exception, the constraints on resources often 
lead various governments to align with donor’s conditions in other to secure their financial 
assistance. Pressures such as intense power crisis and inability to raise capital from the 
domestic market render such government powerless, hence, any financial support from 
external source will be embraced irrespective of the conditions and consequences.  
Mehrotra and Delamonica (2005) observe that in most privatisation initiatives in 
developing countries, donor partners and international organisations strongly push 
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governments to accept the deals, with a lot of them being done behind the scene without 
proper consultation. Rather than improving the management of ECG to bring about 
efficiency, proponents argue that this was sidestepped in favour of privatisation because 
Ghana government could not resist the financial support from USA through the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation Compact II.  
‘When something is coming from outside Ghana we are going to push back easily, 
good or not. So, what would have been nice is for us to recognise that the way we 
run these parastatals over the years has been wrong. So we need either a 
government that is mature enough to step out and say no’ (Chief Executive Officer, 
Solar Light Ghana) 
‘Somebody is sponsoring us, we did not prepare ourselves sufficiently, understand 
ourselves. What do we want? … of course if they say, this is how you have to write 
your renewable energy law, this is what you should put into it, this is what you 
should have; we have net metering so you too put it there; we have this so you too 
have it. Yes sir, ok, when is the money coming? That’s all we will do. So again, 
from those guys point of view they’ve met their interest, they’ve done what they 
needed to do, and they’ve satisfied their stakeholders. Have we satisfied our 
stakeholders?’ (Chief Executive Officer, Solar Light Ghana). 
‘But the issue is that it’s something the government of Ghana has committed itself 
to in an international treaty. The MCC Compact II is an international treaty 
governed by international law so it supersedes even the local laws. It also 
supersedes the Americans own law. It’s not one way, it supersedes our and the 
American law because it is an international treaty. This is not being pushed 
because it is an international treaty’ (MiDA). 
4.1.2.2 Lack of support to create the enabling environment for the policy 
implementation by government 
The inability of Ghana’s power sector off-taker to function effectively is attributable to long 
standing interferences in the sector by various governments. Despite this known fact, one 
of the key discourses that work against the improved management of ECG is government 
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lack of support for the creation of an enabling environment for its implementation. 
Proponents of the improved management of ECG regard the government as the main 
obstructer of the intervention since it is the architect of the present financial troubles of 
the off-taker. 
‘I will say that the reason why some people are kicking against it (privatisation) is 
because of government. Because they feel that government is the cause of the 
problem so don’t blame it on ECG. Government owes ECG so much and they feel 
if government can put in place measures to curtail this, then ECG can operate 
efficiently’ (Head, Renewable Energy Promotion, Energy Commission). 
‘But we do know that what has crippled the ECG is not that we don’t have people 
with brains to deliver but it has been the interference of government to just cripple 
them and the solution is to either make them independent or to give it to the private 
entity to handle, which also brings the independence that is required. The bottom 
line is that ECG has to be restructured. It has to go through a different model of 
management to make it more efficient, for which they can guarantee off-taking of 
renewable technology’ (Deputy Executive Director, ACEP). 
‘They [PUWU] don’t want to accept the blame that ECG has failed because the 
people did not manage the system well. They [PUWU] think ECG has failed 
because government has not given them freedom to operate. They are also saying 
that the concessions or the kind of room we want to give to the private entity if we 
gave the same room to the Ghanaians, they can deliver. I think that is why people 
are also listening to them’ (Deputy Executive Director, ACEP). 
4.1.3 Establishment of a competitive off-taker market in the power sector 
In certain instances, healthy competition in any market could help in the delivery of quality 
products and services hence, there is the need to consider an establishment of a 
competitive off-taker market in the power sector to help boost investment in RE sources 
in Ghana. According to Chicco and Mancarella (2006), competitive market paves the way 
for the introduction of various energy generation technologies in the power sector 
including, renewable energy by the market players in a bid to meet customers’ 
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satisfaction. The creation of a competitive market enhances the socio-economic 
conditions in an economy as it offers lower prices, but of high quality services than what 
a monopolistic market player would set (Kovacic and Shapiro, 2000). Notwithstanding the 
critical role of this policy initiative in unlocking the off-taker risk binding constraint to 
renewable energy investment, its implementation has been obstructed by several factors 
with attendant proponents.  
 
4.1.3.1 Inadequate incentives and resources for its establishment 
The creation of a competitive off-taker market in Ghana’s power sector arguably could be 
beneficial to both consumers and producers in the terms of price and efficiency. According 
to Joskow (2006), every competitive market is dependent on factors such as initial market 
conditions, existing policy, regulatory framework and planned desirable outcomes that 
are to be achieved in the short to long term. Thus, the absence of any of these indicators 
will affect the benefits creation in such a market. Such is the case in the power sector in 
Ghana, making it difficult to establish a competitive off-taker market. The lack of adequate 
investment capital coupled with high interest charges on credit facilities from the domestic 
market make it difficult to operate a competitive off-taker market. The narratives below 
ascribe the reasons for the lack of incentives and resources to create a competitive off-
taker market in Ghana. 
‘Yes, if that is established. If you have an off-taker market and somebody is ready 
to take the renewables, the question is why are they ready to take it? Unless there 
is some binding obligation, otherwise I can guarantee you that whatever the 
renewable supplier is going to give, in most cases it tends to be more expensive 
than what the conventional people are going to supply. Unless you have a cheaper 
renewable. You take a look at the feed in tariff as approved by the PURC and see 
whether they can compete with the conventional system. It is only the biogas and 
others that appear to be a bit competitive. So if the off-taker is given a free will to 
choose where he takes his supply from and there is no compulsion, ideally they 
won’t go in for renewables because then, unless they will be able to sell it on and 
get their money’ (Chief Executive Officer, KITE). 
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4.1.3.2 Lack of political will to drive the process 
Political will shapes and guides how policies are pursued and implemented for economic 
growth especially, in developing countries. The determination of government and 
politicians to pursue certain agenda influences the creation of enabling environment to 
facilitate implementation of that agenda (Narayan et al., 2000). Carmel (2009) identifies 
factors that influence political will of government to implement policies that promote 
development to include promotion of transparency, responsiveness and accountability. 
Proponents of the establishment of a competitive off-taker market in the power sector in 
Ghana argue that one of the nemesis to its non-implementation is the lack of political will. 
‘I think it has been discussed but we don’t see the will to do that. People are not 
willing to leave that hold of power where you can influence the granting of licenses 
from the Energy commission or any other because obviously if you don’t have 
‘connections’ it is difficult to get a license in Ghana if you don’t have a push backing 
from the political side, there can be noise about it but you are not going to get a 
license’ (Deputy Executive Director, ACEP). 
4.1.3.3 Technical challenges 
The inability to establish a competitive off-taker market also has to do with technical 
challenges. This further boils down to the low state of technological knowhow in most 
African countries. According to Cowan and Jonard (2004), in diffusion of knowledge it 
creates second experts who are able to replicate technologies and in some instances 
able to advance on them. This has a great impact on economic growth due to its potential 
to cut down future cost associated with the diffusion of knowledge and also profiting the 
country through replications. Financial constraints are likely to hinder the affordability of 
these technologies. The creation of the competitive off-taker market in Ghana is noted to 
suffer from technological challenges either due to lack of affordability of such technologies 
or the inability to create second expertise of such technologies.  
‘Part of it is technical. Then you have to bill appropriately. Now, you can have a 
choice of billing service. Will it really solve the problem? I don’t know. Let’s say 
there is ECG and GCE and I feel I’m paying too much for ECG and GCE says, oh, 
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our service charge is 4 cedis instead of 6 cedis and I switch, am I really going to 
gain much. The other side is to say that this part of town is under ECG and the 
other part of town is under GCE, but then there is no mobility, there’s no real 
competition. You’ve just created 2 monopolies because they are exclusive. Would 
you have gained the price competitiveness?’(Chief Executive Officer, Solar Light 
Ghana). 
‘It depends on how the infrastructure was built. If for instance Asogli wants to 
supply Accra Central, does Asogli need to develop its own infrastructure? Let’s say 
I want to be an off-taker then I need to build my own system because ECG and 
Asogli also use that system. So when the energy goes into it, I don’t know how it 
is going to be differentiated. Unless at a point in time, we have a system where for 
instance Asogli, produces, sell about 100 kW to a local person in Accra central at 
15 cents per kW, the local person supplies it at 18 cents per kW and pays Asogli 
their share. So when there is any leakage in the system, a person in the local 
environment will have the resources to check where the leakages are’ 
(Coordinator, KASA-Ghana). 
4.1.4 Establishment of guarantee systems for power producers 
Yergin (2006) observes that a guarantee system provides security in that it cushions 
investors’ investments against shocks. Security systems for energy production such as 
the establishment of a guarantee system need to have features that encourage 
diversification of supply from various technologies, create a buffer system in the power 
sector to serve as resilience against shocks, and facilitates recovery against shocks 
(Yergin, 2006). Hence, a guarantee system with such features ensures successes at the 
energy sector as it boosts confidence of investors even in a risky environment due to the 
surety of making gains from the investment made (Iwayemi, 2008).  Factors obstructing 
the smooth implementation of this policy intervention are teased out from the narratives 
embodying the in-depth interviews’ responses.   
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4.1.4.1 Emphasis geared towards addressing Risks than the establishment of 
guarantee systems 
Notwithstanding the prospects this policy intervention could unleash to help in overcoming 
the challenges crippling investment in renewable energy sources in Ghana, its opponents 
argue that it is sub-optimal for addressing the off-taker risk problem. The existing off-taker 
challenge calls for a credible off-taker that will be able to provide measures to guarantee 
investment in the sector. The ability to reform ECG to have a credible financial status, 
free from governmental interferences and being able to carry out its own investment  
efficiently, will be more beneficial than the implementation of this policy intervention, its 
opponents argue. Moreover, they opine that if the macroeconomic indicators of the 
country are put in good shape, the risks on investments will be absorbed by default and, 
a guarantee system will not be needed, as the excerpted views below manifest. 
‘We believe that if ECG is reformed and they become financially credible then this 
issue of wanting government to guarantee will be a thing of the past’ (Head, 
Renewable Energy Promotion, Energy Commission). 
‘I think for the guarantee system, if we have a credible off-taker, the off-taker should 
be able to guarantee the purchase of power. As it is now, we will have to restructure 
ECG and NEDCO to make sure they can guarantee else government will have to 
continue to guarantee’ (Deputy Executive Director, ACEP). 
‘I think the economy itself is affecting everything. Because if ECG were doing well, 
this issue of wanting government guarantee will not be talked about’ (Head, 
Renewable Energy Promotion, Energy Commission). 
‘All investors are asking for all sorts of things and you need to now go through, 
negotiate it out, and use the laws we have to provide some assurances. … You 
have to go running after banks. The bank of Ghana says no, I can’t guarantee that 
for you because it is an open market and the Commercial Banks also tell you they 
cannot hedge for you. So these are the issues. For us, we see all these going 
through the macro economic variables. Taxes have been a big issue’ (General 
Manager, Electricity Company of Ghana) 
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‘If Bank of Ghana says I don’t have answer to forex, me as a power distributor, 
what do I do? The investor needs it, Bank of Ghana can’t provide so I sit. 
Meanwhile the customers need it but I can’t go and say I am guaranteeing for it. 
So it’s a tall order. It took us over three months working on forex. Eventually the 
solution had to be to go to the market to source our own…’ (General Manager, 
Electricity Company of Ghana). 
‘A bigger risk is the macro economy. I will put that before I will put in the guarantee 
system because what would the guarantee be? It’s most likely government 
eventually, or the distributor (off-taker) saying that, ok, I’ll make sure you get paid… 
you are in such an environment where your inflation is paralysing, your currency is 
depreciating, the economy is bad, people’s purchasing power is low… all these 
things are happening and you give me a guarantee’ (Chief Executive Officer, Solar 
Light Ghana). 
4.2 Faulty Power Sector Regulation Constraint  
Effective regulation of the power sector with incentivised strategies tailored towards 
renewable energy development are paramount for shoring up investment in renewable 
energy sources. All over the world, various countries are formulating and implementing 
such policies on renewable energy, to boost energy security and climate change 
mitigation drive. Although Ghana’s power sector regulatory landscape aims at diversifying 
energy portfolios in order to enhance green economy, it is still fraught with challenges 
that undermine renewable energy investors’ confidence.  
‘…we have regulatory bodies that are not encouraging the industry. Therefore if I 
put myself in the shoes of the investor, I am not going to invest in this mess. I am 
not surprised that people are not willing to put their money in that sector under the 
renewable energy law’ (Executive Director, Solar Light Company Limited). 
‘Let the people understand the incentives, put the structures in place and they will 
get it. How many people know there is a renewable law in this country? People 
don’t know and even people within the sector. They don’t know that we have a 
renewable law that allows them to generate their own power and sell to the grid. 
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When you have done so, how do you sell? You don’t have the metering system to 
do that’ (Deputy Executive Director, ACEP). 
Nonetheless, policy interventions such as establishing a full-time level facilitator in the 
power sector; establishing a reliable and transparent full-cost tariff pricing system; and 
full implementation of the RE Act (Act 832) and its enshrined subsidiary instruments could 
have addressed the faulty regulatory constraint in Ghana, if implemented. The obstructers 
of their non-implementation are discoursed below. 
4.2.1 Establish a full-time high level IPP facilitator in the Power Sector 
According to Eberhard et al., (2008) standard reform, which entails unbundling, 
privatisation, wholesale and retail competition has not succeeded in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
As a result the ‘hybrid’ power markets have emerged, where state-owned utilities and 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs) coexist. IPPs are required due to Government’s 
inability to raise capital, but there is a need for appropriate enabling environments to 
attract IPPs. One-shop facilities to simplify permitting procedures for IPPs can contribute 
to create this enabling environment.   
‘...when it is done, it will facilitate processing applications in the country because, 
we realised that as the investor moves from office to office, he/she is not 
conversant with our set-up and at times, will even not be well received or will have 
to be nice [dishing out gifts in different forms] with somebody before  being 
attended to. With this IPP facilitator, however, the investor would not have to move 
from one office to the other. You have an officer who will go round to process 
whatever is required. I think it is a very good idea’. (Head, Renewable Energy 
Promotion, Energy Commission). 
4.2.1.1 Extra cost Dimension  
One of the reasons stakeholders speak against this policy intervention, hence, its non-
implementation is that  it is unnecessary and will only add extra cost, since current 
practices in the power sector already take account of that. Opponent to this policy 
intervention argue that the Energy Commission of Ghana is already playing this function, 
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hence, there is no need to duplicate it, except to strengthen the EC’ operation as well as 
the PURC and the Ministry of Power (MoP), due to their supporting roles. Also, emerging 
strongly from the in-depth narratives about the unnecessariness of the policy intervention 
relates to the fact that having all investment activities being approved under one roof is 
considered to be impossible. This is because the renewable energy investment circle in 
Ghana involves different phases, each with its different requirement. Therefore collapsing 
some phases is not possible especially, during Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) phase 
as it entails direct engagement of the investors. 
‘Is it even necessary if we have the energy commission to deliver that? That is 
going to be another cost on the process, because EC will still be there to regulate 
the sector which we are paying them for. Another body will also be charging for 
accessing their services and that also becomes another cost on the deployment of 
the technology. I don’t think it is too big a role for the EC to deliver. But I think the 
energy commission is not also thinking outside the box to promote renewables’ 
(Deputy Executive Director, ACEP). 
 
‘Negotiation for PPA cannot be done by somebody else. It is the investor himself 
that should do the negotiation. So, that I believe will be out of the equation. Again, 
when it comes to the environmental impact assessment, I believe the investor 
should be involved. We can have that for some of the processes but there are 
some others that the investor himself will have to be involved in’ (Head, Renewable 
Energy Promotion, Energy Commission). 
4.2.2 Establishment of a reliable and transparent full-cost tariff pricing system 
The introduction of cost-reflective pricing of electricity has strong linkages with renewable 
energy investment and by extension, its development. The incorporation of this policy 
measure into the regulatory landscape has the propensity to attract more investments on 
renewable energy supply. Escribano (2010), observes that countries with cost-reflective 
electricity tariffs attract more non-hydrocarbon power producers due to the creation of 
equal play field for the energy producers. This regulatory instrument has the potentials to 
50 
 
cushion renewable energy power utilities against collapse since producers are assured 
of readily market on the basis of the equal ground being created to compete with non-
renewable generators (Hertzmark, 2012). Proponents of this regulatory measure attest to 
its investment boosting drive for renewable energy in Ghana as captured in the view 
below.  
‘It will be realistic and cost reflective tariffs. That is the plan. So PURC will be 
working with the consultant who will develop all this. The concessionaire comes in 
and knows that for the next 20 to 25 years this is the tariff structure we are going 
to use’ (MiDA Team). 
However, the lack of implementation of this regulatory policy measure has been 
underpinned by the following opposing factors and their proponents.  
4.2.2.1 Unaffordability argument 
A major argument against cost recovery pricing is unaffordability. Prasad and Visagie 
(2005) argue that at full cost, tariff becomes relatively higher than what consumers would 
have been able to afford. According to the Department of Minerals (1998) if full cost is not 
well planned before its introduction, it does not only affect household income and 
consumers affordability levels, but the growth of the sector and the economy at large. 
Once full pricing of electricity reduces consumption, many people will shift to the use of 
unclean traditional energy sources (Mehlwana and Qase, 1998; Thom, 2000) thereby 
defeating the main purpose of promoting clean energy. Views from stakeholders siding 
with this unaffordability reason for the non-implementation of cost recovery pricing are 
captured below.  
‘I think we know that renewables are more expensive than the conventional, 
looking at the financial considerations. Therefore if we bring in full cost pricing, the 
end user tariff will go high. We are in a situation where the average consumer 
cannot afford so we need to balance some of these things’ (Head, Renewable 
Energy Promotion, Energy Commission). 
‘Even with the FiTs though the IPPs are complaining that it is not good enough, 
they are still higher than the regular tariff. So that is the cost as certified by the 
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PURC for the IPPs or the private developers who come in. It means that the issue 
about affordability is still there’ (Chief Executive Officer, KITE). 
‘If the increase in thermal power is warranting increase in tariff, then adding more 
renewables to the mix is only going to push tariffs up. Are we ready for that? ... So 
I think there are other priorities’ (Chief Executive Officer, KITE). 
4.2.2.2 Electricity regarded as a public good  
A major driver of the push against the establishment of a reliable and transparent full-cost 
tariff pricing system in Ghana is the tagging of electricity as a public good and the need 
for prices to remain low.  Historically, government interferences in the power sector 
especially, in the developing world, have emboldened this assertion.  There is now a 
game play on tariff settings in most developing countries, in which consumers clamour 
for low-tariff from politicians in exchange for votes (Barnett et al., 2016). Buttressing this 
widely held view of electricity being regarded as a public good are the following narratives 
from interviewed stakeholders.  
‘Yes. So we start from the perception of electricity as a public good. Then it means 
government has to have a hand in it… it means we the consumers also expect it 
to be cheap. You know, it’s a right. Clean water? Yes. Good health, access to 
health care? Yes. Electricity? Not necessarily. Can there be a good quality of life 
without electricity? It’s difficult but possible. Can there be a decent quality of life 
without clean water? Absolutely not. Can there be a good quality of life without 
access to health care? Absolutely not. But to me, electricity is a maybe. I can 
survive without electricity’ (Chief Executive Officer, Solar Light Ghana). 
‘You see, it is one philosophy that hasn’t helped the sector. I’ve said it on TV and 
radio several times, if we don’t stop seeing the energy sector as a social service 
and treat it as business, we will run into this challenge. If you want to talk about 
social equity and how everybody has to have access, fine., but should not be 
treated as a public good’ (Chief Executive Officer, KITE). 
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4.2.3 Full Implementation of the RE Act (Act 832) and its enshrined subsidiary 
instruments  
An important policy initiative to overcoming the faulty power sector in Ghana to enhance 
renewable energy investment is the full implementation of the RE Act (Act 832) and its 
enshrined subsidiary instruments. Couture (2010), argues that countries that developed 
and implemented clear RE regulatory instruments such as FiT, net-metering, and RE fund 
have achieved impressive share of renewable energy supply in their energy mix. 
Regulatory instruments including FiT have been used worldwide to galvanise effective 
renewable energy development and at a lower cost (Ragwitz et al., 2007; Butler and 
Neuhoff, 2008; European Commission, 2008).  
Net-metering system also presents great opportunity for companies and individual 
households to contribute to renewable energy development. According to Beck and 
Martinot (2004), net-metering encourages individuals to ‘invest in renewable energy 
because the retail price received for power is usually much greater than it would be if net 
metering were not allowed and customers had to sell excess power to the utility at 
wholesale rates or avoided costs’ (p.16). The effect of renewable energy fund on 
renewable energy investment has been explored by Beck and Martinot (2004) as another 
regulatory instrument to incentivise investors to take opportunity of credit facilities, which 
in most cases have lower interest rates than those from mainstream financial institutions. 
Ghana’s RE Act (Act 832) embodies all these regulatory instruments, however, they have 
not been implemented fully and the factors obstructing their full implementation are 
discussed below. 
4.2.3.1 Non-incentivisation Approach to RE Development  
A critical factor militating against the full implementation of Ghana’s RE Act (Act 832) and 
its enshrined subsidiary instruments is the non-existence of incentive approaches to RE 
development in the country. Subsidiary instruments such as permits for mini-grids as 
concessions are important, however, Act 832, does not support that. An investor risks 
engaging in either developing a mini-grid or a net-metering system. The following 
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narratives sum up the paucity of incentives within the RE Act (Act 832) to boost 
investment.  
‘The truth of the matter is that when you come to the renewables, the approach 
has always been different even in matured democracies and matured countries 
like the UK and the US, they never went straight through the market route where 
you allow the market forces to determine the place of renewables. There were 
incentives mechanisms through the FiT with the obligation to pay. We cannot do 
otherwise because our scenario is even more complicated’ (Chief Executive 
Officer, KITE). 
‘You see with mini-grid, our system is not structured such that you can be an off-
taker at the same time unless you will be doing net-metering or own use. Even net-
metering there is a cap. You don’t go beyond a certain threshold else you become 
a permanent generator to the grid. The concept of net-metering is you are 
generating for home use first, but if there is some surplus you feed to the grid. The 
grid wouldn’t pay you money but we would work out an equation where you can 
also draw the same energy’ (General Manager, ECG). 
‘The net metering, nobody is going to pay you money. So you just offset what you 
are going to consume with what you can produce. So even if you have the capacity 
to do more, if you do more you are dashing it to the system. Assuming you are 
consuming 100mwh and you can produce 200MWh, you wouldn’t get paid you but 
you pay for producing additional power than you have consumed’ (Chief Executive 
Officer, KITE). 
The FiT, which plays a key role in the attraction of investors into the renewable sector in 
other jurisdictions is confronted with a lot of uncertainties in Ghana. For example, its short-
term guarantee years is a great disincentive as investors cannot really determine the fate 
of their investments after the guarantee year as voiced out by some stakeholders.  
‘Some investors have challenges with the feed in tariff. Some people say I am 
bringing solar with modified technology and you want to give me the same price 
as somebody who is using ordinary solar panels. If I am providing backups or 
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storage, would it be the same price as somebody who is just feeding into the grid 
and when the sun is down he is down? So those are the issues’ (General Manager, 
ECG). 
‘We have the key issue as being the renewable energy Act, which says that the 
tariffs cannot be changed before 10 years. But then for investments like this, we 
are looking at a lifespan of twenty to thirty years. So if you are only guaranteed for 
ten years then what happens to the 10 or 20 years left? So this is some of the 
issues that hold back some of this investors’ (General Manager, ECG). 
 
The challenges surrounding the RE Fund also add to the numerous disincentives 
underlining the implementation issue of the RE Act.   
‘It (RE fund) is a very tricky issue… there are renewable energy projects that we are 
doing,that is the national rooftop project and all the money that is supposed to be 
sitting in the fund is being used for this project…’ (Head, Renewable Energy 
Promotion, Energy Commission). 
‘I think nobody accounts for RE fund… we don’t even know how much is in there. 
There is so much secrecy. If you go to the Energy Commission website, they don’t 
give you how much is in the fund and which targeted areas it is meant for. So, 
there isn’t transparency on the fund. I think that is also a major difficulty. In the 
past, they said it wasn’t much but I think now it has been adjusted in the petroleum 
levies. I think we should try to see how they are using the fund. Whether it is 
adequate or inadequate’ (Deputy Executive Director, ACEP). 
4.2.3.2 RE not considered as an immediate priority by policy makers 
Another factor accounting for the non-implementation of the renewable energy Act and 
its subsidiary instruments relates to the orientation of policy makers about what they view 
as energy security, as many do not consider RE as an immediate priority. Policy makers 
are presently more focused on meeting energy demands irrespective of whether the 
sources are harmful to the environment or not because of the country’s prolonged power 
challenges. The short-term interventions for the prolonged power crisis failed to capture 
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the need for using renewables to address the power crisis.  Similarly, while the medium-
term strategy for attaining an energy security mentions the need for renewable 
contribution, it lacks clear targeting of how renewable energy should be developed as the 
following narratives from key stakeholders reveal.  
‘Our primary focus, however, is to address the short term challenges without losing 
focus on our medium term development plans. To this end the Ministry is working 
on different Emergency Power arrangements to shore up the supply situation. 
These arrangements will eventually increase our generation capacity by about 
1,000MW in the short term and ultimately provide us the platform to pursue the 
medium to long term solutions. We are hopeful that these measures will stabilise 
the situation. To achieve this, the following power plants are being pursued: -
250MW project at Aboadze, -2 x 225MW Power ship and -250MW GE Plant’ 
(Former Minister of Power of Ghana).11  
‘In the medium term, the Ministry is taking steps to add in excess of 3,000MW 
through the following projects: 360MW Asogli Phase 2 Project (sod has been cut), 
350MW CenPower Project (Sod has been cut) 360MWJacobsen Project 
(Parliamentary approval obtained for GCSA) 240MW Amandi Project 
(Parliamentary approval obtained for GCSA), GE 1,000 Project (Discussions 
ongoing) 1,000MW of ‘clean’ coal into the generation mix and use of solar in 
households and basic lighting and water heating to free grid power for industrial 
use’ (Former Minister of Power of Ghana).12    
‘In this world there is a balance in everything. So you can get all the renewables in 
Ghana. Let’s say you do solar only, then at a point the sun refuses to shine and 
we have three days of continuous rain, are you saying Ghanaians should go 
without power? So those are the issues. Security of supply is also very key …’ 
(General Manager, ECG). 
‘So now the basic preoccupation is this… you go to the Ministry of Power (MoP) 
and they will tell you that all the countries that have developed didn’t bother about 
                                                          
11 http://www.peacefmonline.com/pages/local/news/201502/231810.php  
12 http://www.peacefmonline.com/pages/local/news/201502/231810.php  
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the environment, but we are being forced to think about it, because of the era in 
which we are. So Coal is on the table, nuclear is on the table and renewables are 
capped at maximum 10%’ (Chief Executive Officer, KITE). 
‘I wouldn’t even advocate that we should build our energy futures on renewables. 
It’s the energy for the future but when you are in a serious deficit, it will take you a 
lot more effort to be able to use the renewables to achieve that … So, I am all for 
getting additional generation, but I think we should go for cleaner thermal plants 
and gas is the cleanest among the range of thermal options’ (Chief Executive 
Officer, KITE). 
4.2.3.3 Lack of political will  
Self-seeking attitude of politicians and the lack of will to create equal opportunities for 
renewables downplay investment in the renewable energy sector. Pushing for personal 
agendas, against the wellbeing of the country results in severe developmental challenges 
and high costs. Such ill-motives and lack of political will create undue favour for 
investment in other energy technologies over investment in the renewable energies 
(Carmen, 2009). In respect of Ghana, many stakeholders argue that a fundamental driver 
of the lack of full implementation of the renewable energy Act (Act 832) is because of the 
lack of political will. In consequence, public and private investment in the sector has been 
stalled.  
‘You have one arm of government or ministry promoting a green agenda and the 
other doing something that contradicts it. Ghana signed up to the sustainable 
energy for all initiative and our president chaired something in the UN on 
sustainable energy and we are talking about coal. So there is a disconnect’ (Chief 
Executive Officer, KITE). 
‘I don’t even think the minister (former minister of power) thinks of the renewable 
option when he gets up. It is about how to get fuel and thermal plants running when 
you don’t need fuel for renewables’ (Deputy Executive Director, ACEP). 
‘We are where we are because the political drive is not strong. When we wanted 
KARPOWERSHIP barge to happen it happened, when we wanted AMERI power 
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barge it happened, when we wanted Bui we made it happen. Whatever we want 
to do we can make it happen if our drive is there. If we want to promote renewables 
it should be because we see it as our future… [but] strictly speaking, they have an 
election to win and they probably wouldn’t bother about renewables’ (Chief 
Executive Officer, KITE). 
‘…you can ask yourself if you have power crisis and they are considering solving 
it, over five years, renewable energy couldn’t even feature and you see people 
rushing contracts to parliament, it is an emergency and a minister will write a whole 
brief on what makes it an emergency and they go and get the approval from 
parliament, emergency is supposed to be delivered in three months …a year on it 
hasn’t been delivered and the ministers are still pushing it for it to be delivered’ 
(Deputy Executive Director, ACEP). 
‘I think as a country, we look more at numbers [votes during election] than at 
solving problems. More at numbers in the sense that as you do them, the benefit 
won’t be within four years. But you need the numbers within four years. So let me 
go in for the cheaper solution where at the end of the four years I will get the 
numbers’ (Coordinator, KASA-Ghana). 
4.3 Lack of access to appropriate finance 
Financial instruments remain essential ingredients for the development of renewable 
energy. It is therefore not surprising that governments and policy makers in developed 
countries create economic and financial incentives to facilitate the development of 
renewable energy technologies. According to Painuly (2001), credit subsidy was 
introduced in Denmark to finance renewable energy development for a 10 year time 
period. Other financial instruments such as tax exemptions, credit facilities and third party 
financing mechanisms are also introduced in other jurisdictions in developed economics 
to boost renewable energy investment (IEA, 1997).  Credit facilities in the form of public 
benefit funds levied on energy consumption were introduced in the United States and 
some European countries to help push renewable energy development agenda. 
According to Beck and Martinot (2004) the public fund benefit was one of the most 
effective policies to have helped in the promotion of renewable energy technologies in 
58 
 
those jurisdictions. Incentive-based renewable energy programmes are other forms of 
financial instruments that encourage renewable energy development. The incentive base 
support for renewable energy technologies have been introduced in developing countries 
such as Indonesia and Sri Lanka by the World Bank. In Africa, micro-credits have also 
been introduced in Uganda and Zimbabwe (Painuly, 2001). Such credit facilities are 
mostly in the form of project financing and corporate financing (Wiser and Pickle, 1997). 
Sadly, access to appropriate finance in Ghana is a big challenge. This therefore, weighs 
heavily on the ability of prospective investors in the renewable energy sector and, critically 
the factors obstructing the existence of such opportunities need to be ascertained.  
4.3.1 Low financial portfolios of domestic banks 
A fundamental factor underpinning the lack of appropriate finance in Ghana and thereby 
affects renewable energy investment is the low financial portfolios of domestic banks. 
Despite those acknowledgements about the positive effect on renewable energy 
development, current financial portfolios of domestic banks cannot make the policy 
implementable. The low financial portfolio status of domestic banks put them at risk if they 
give out the type of huge credits that are needed by investors to undertake investment in 
renewable energy. This is because any non-repayment will cripple such financial 
institutions. The high rate of non-repayment of loans as a result of high risk of doing 
business in Ghana and most developing nations makes banks very cautious in giving out 
financial resources. Also, the current low portfolios of domestic banks do not encourage 
investors to take credit facilities due to the inability of banks to give long-term financial 
supports since they do not have the resources to do that.  
‘There is a weakness in the banking sector. Most of our banks do not have the 
muscle to raise financing to support investors or investments coming in. So you 
will see that all the big financing comes from outside’ (General Manager, ECG). 
‘Ghanaian banks are not bold. They do not also have the money. If you are having 
a 50 million project and you ask them for 10 million they can’t give that to you 
because if you don’t pay, the business will collapse’ (Deputy Executive Director, 
Africa Center for Energy Policy, ACEP) 
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The high risk of doing business coupled with the low portfolios of domestic banks makes 
accessing of loans difficult and expensive. This affects the pricing of electricity from 
renewable energy sources. This in turns affects consumers’ willingness to appreciate the 
usefulness of the technology as it is perceived to be expensive relative to other 
technologies. At this point the appreciation about the environmental usefulness is totally 
absent in the consideration of consumers and this therefore creates the opportunity for 
investors to venture into other energy productions that they are assured of the profitability.  
‘The technology is still a bit expensive and you need to get a good feed in tariff 
before you can make good business. Unfortunately, we also don’t have flexible 
financing schemes. We don’t have appropriate schemes that one could apply to. 
We still have to deal with the same commercial banks (Ecobank, Standard 
Charted, etc.) and they don’t understand the investment aspect in the renewables. 
They are still doing short-term loans and loans with 30% to 35% interest rates’ 
(Executive Director of KITE) 
‘If I go to the bank and say I’ve been doing [trading in solar] this for many years so 
give me money so that I can expand, I won’t be able to survive under the terms. 
When I go to borrow working capital, I’m being charged something like 40%. Then 
you look at foreign investment’ (Executive Director, Solar Light Company Limited). 
This high interest charges on credit facilities and the inability of domestic banks to 
undertake long term financing are mostly as a result of macro –economic risk. The inability 
to charge loans at rate below the policy rate given by the central bank does not only make 
interest rate unbearable for investors, but makes foreign supports to domestic banks to 
relieve high interest for renewable investors absolutely impossible. Thus, it obstructs 
investment in the renewable energy sector. There is also the issue of lack of stability in 
the macro-economic indicators such as inflation and exchange rates.  
‘A lot has to do with macro indicators instability… because the risk attached to any 
credit is liked to inflation, currency appreciation or depreciation. So the macro 
economy is not right for the domestic credit. That makes it difficult for them to also 
lend for the terms that would allow the renewable to be viable… Even the fact that 
you are going to collect your tariffs in Cedi currency. Even if you have the highest 
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of tariffs, by the time you collect them you convert back to dollars, it would have 
lost value. So sometimes, when it’s happening to the ECG and sometimes they 
increase the tariff after one to two years, it’s not an increase in real terms. It is just 
restoring them to where they used to be’ (Executive Director, KITE). 
5. COALITION FOR CHANGE AND CONCLUSION 
5.1 Coalition for change and imperative interventions for policy implementation 
In this sub-section, stakeholders who hold strategic positions in selected civil servants 
associations, public and private institutions, were asked to indicate as to whether they 
support or oppose the potential policies identified as remedies to the binding constraints 
discussed in the above section.13 They included the Policy Officer (AGI); Senior 
Investment Officer (GIPC); Governance and Macroeconomist (KfW Bank); Country 
Economist (IGC); CEO (IGGS); Coordinator (KASA); Assistant Project Officer (KITE); 
Senior M&E Officer (MiDA); Director (PURC); Branch Chairman (PUWU); Director (Solar 
Light Company); Researcher (TUC); Market Research Officer (UT Bank); Senior 
Economist (PEF) and Programme Manager (GII),. They were further required to suggest 
alternative policies to the proposed ones irrespective of their positions in terms of support 
or opposition. Dominant suggested alternative policies represent coalition policies that 
are accepted by all and could yield similar results for change just like the initially proposed 
policies. These are depicted graphically below, with brief discussions of their implications. 
Policies proposed towards the Off-Taker Risk constraint include privatisation of the 
revenue arm of the power sector, improved management of ECG including revenue 
collection, promotion of efficient technical practices within the distribution arm of the 
power sector through privatisation and establishment of a competitive off-taker market in 
the power sector. In respect of the faulty power sector regulatory constraint, proposed 
                                                          
13 The acronyms for these organisations are defined as follows: AGI -Association of Ghana Industries; GIPC - Ghana 
Investment Promotion Council; GII -Ghana Integrity Initiative; IGC –International Growth Centre; IGGS – 
Institute of Green Growth Solution; KASA –Kasa Initiative Ghana;  KITE –Kumasi Institute of Technology and 
Environment;  MiDA –Millennium Development Authority;  PEF –Private Enterprise Federation; PURC –Public 
Utilities Regulatory Commission of Ghana; PUWU –Public Utilities Workers Union; Solar Light –Solar Light Ghana; 
TUC –Trade Union Congress; UT Bank –UT Bank Ghana Ltd 
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policies to overcome it included the establishment of a full time high level IPP facilitator, 
establishment of a reliable and transparent full-cost tariff pricing system and full 
implementation of the Renewable Energy Act (Act 832). On the other hand, policies 
proposed to overcome the lack of access to appropriate finance include the establishment 
of a RE financial instrument within domestic banks with lower interest rate. 
The privatisation of the revenue arm of the power sector policy received high level support 
from majority of the institutions interviewed, with only PUWU, GII, TUC and Solar Light 
opposing this policy (Figure3). Various alternative policies have been proposed by these 
stakeholders from these institutions as capable of addressing the off-taker risk constraint. 
However, only stakeholders from GIPC, MiDA and IGC, who support the policy, and 
PUWU and Solar Light Company, who oppose the policy, have proposed a common 
alternative policy that can be considered as a coalition policy for change. This alternative 
policy to the privatisation of the revenue arm of the power sector entails guaranteeing the 
independence of ECG devoid of government interference. The strategy proposed by 
representatives of these institutions is to help expand the prepaid system to all public and 
private institutions in order for the ECG to be able to maximise revenue collection.  
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Figure 3: Coalition for Privatisation of revenue arm of the power sector policy 
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Figure 4: Coalition for improved management of ECG policy 
 
Similar to the privatisation of the revenue arm of the power sector policy, improvement in 
the management of ECG policy is widely accepted by majority of the institutions’ 
representatives (Figure 4) as an important solution to the off-taker constraint. Only AGI, 
PEF and KfW Development Bank oppose this policy. The proposed alternative policy 
option is prepaid metering system and independence of the ECG, similar to the coalition 
policy for the privatisation of the revenue arm of the power sector policy. 
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Figure 5: Coalition for promotion of efficient technical practices within the 
distribution arm of the power sector through privatisation policy 
 
With the exception of AGI, KASA and TUC, all the other institutions gave overwhelming 
support for the promotion of efficient technical practices within the distribution arm of the 
power sector through privatisation. Despite the different ideologies, GII, PEF, UT Bank, 
IGC, Solar Light, AGI and TUC agreed that ensuring effective checks and balances in 
addition, on the power sector will improve technical efficiency (Figure 5).  
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Figure 6: Coalition for establishment of competitive off-taker market 
 
 
While all but one (Solar Light Company, Ghana) gave maximum endorsement for the 
establishment of a competitive off-taker market in the power sector, PURC, MiDA, UT 
Bank, TUC, PEF and Solar Light were of the view that the creation of good regulatory 
environment could equally achieve similar results in minimising off-taker risks in the power 
sector (Figure 6). 
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Figure 7: Coalition for establishment of a full time high level IPP facilitator in the 
power sector policy 
All the other institutions apart from GIPC and PEF are in support of the establishment of 
a full time high level IPP facilitator in the power sector (Figure 7). According to GIPC and 
PEF, a better option, which TUC and Solar Light company Ghana agreed to as an 
alternative policy to the one they support, is the enforcement and activation of existing 
IPP facilitation regulations and not the establishment of a new entity.  
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Figure 8: Coalition for the establishment of a reliable and transparent full-cost tariff 
pricing system 
 
Majority of the institutions’ stakeholders support the establishment of a reliable and 
transparent full-cost tariff pricing system to overcome the faulty power sector regulatory 
constraint (Figure 8). While GIPC, Solar Light Company Ghana, MiDA and PEF thought 
automatic tariff adjustment system devoid of government intervention is a viable 
alternative, none of the opposing institutions are in agreement. In effects, no coalition 
policies exist between supporting and opposing institutions. 
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Figure 9: Coalition for full implementation of the Renewable Energy Act (Act 832) 
policy 
 
There is total support for full implementation of the Renewable Energy Act (Act 832) by 
all institutions interviewed. This is considered by all the institutions as a mean to overcome 
the faulty power sector regulatory constraint. Nevertheless, MiDA and IGC were of the 
view that reducing or removing taxes on RETs equipment is equally imperative. 
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Figure 10: Coalition for establishment of RE financial instrument within domestic 
banks with lower interest rate 
 
 
The establishment of RE financial instrument within domestic banks with lower interest 
rate is a potential policy that could overcome access to appropriate finance’s constraint. 
All the institutions except GII and PEF are in support of this policy. While Solar Light 
Company Ghana and KfW Development Bank proposed external fund sourcing through 
loans, grants and Climate Change Funds as an alternative mean to improve access to 
finance for RE projects, it is not very popular among other supporting institutions as well 
as opposing institutions. Apart from aforementioned two institutions, all the other 
institutions hold divergent views on alternative policy actions to the proposed 
establishment of RE financial instrument within domestic banks in Ghana. In other words, 
there is no common/coalition policy between supporting and opposing institutions of the 
proposed policy. The policy (establishment of RE financial instrument within domestic 
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banks with lower interest rate), however, is overwhelmingly supported by many 
institutions. 
Having discussed the varied reasons why the RE sub-sector remains largely under 
developed in the midst of abundant potential policies to unlock the binding constraints to 
renewable energy investment in Ghana, it is imperative to identify interventions needed 
to help swing various interest groups unto a common agreement under each policy. This 
is to help harmonise the divergent views about the policies, as different institutions that 
either support or oppose the proposed policies suggest alternative policies that are 
regarded as coalition policies for change. Secondly it will help achieve a common interest 
about how to effectively address constraints and unlock opportunities for investment in 
the renewable energy sector. Presented in Table 5 are identified interventions based on 
the discussions above that are needed to unify divergent views about the policies 
together. 
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Table 5: Key interventions to achieve full implementation of potential policies   
 
Source: Author’s construct, 2016       
Constraint Potential Policy Interventions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Off-Taker Risk 
Privatisation of the revenue arm of 
the power sector.  
 Encourage broad consultation and also make it reflective of the country 
needs. 
 Undertake proper sensitisation about the need for the implementation of the 
policy. 
Improved management of ECG 
including revenue collection 
(especially revenue from debtors – 
government and others)  
 Government willingness to eliminate subventions and interference from the 
sector  
 Encourage the development of comprehensive plans and strategies even 
before soliciting for financial aid especially, from donor organisations.  
Establishment of a competitive off-
taker market in the power sector. 
 Political will to create the enabling environment for public, private sector 
participation to address the resource constraint of government. 
 Embrace knowledge and technology diffusion   
Establishment of guarantee 
systems for power producers  
 Strengthen fiscal and monetary instruments to address macro-economic 
risks that necessitate demands of guarantee system in power sector. 
  Make alternative security measures much enticing for investors. 
Faulty power sector 
regulation 
 
 
 
Establish a full-time high level IPP 
facilitator in the power sector. 
 Strengthen the Energy Commission of Ghana to become more autonomous 
and independent. 
Establishment of a reliable and 
transparent full-cost tariff pricing 
system 
 Eschew public good ideology created by politicians and promote energy 
efficiency programmes especially at rural areas to address affordability 
concerns. 
Full Implementation of the RE-Act 
and its enshrined subsidiary 
instruments (Net-metering, mini-
grid systems, and the RE fund and 
levies) 
 Promote and implement findings of local research that unearth better ways 
to implement subsidiary instruments such as net-metering, mini-grid and 
Feed-in tariff. 
 Synchronisation of all energy policies to determine how renewable energy 
will be rollout to eschew political favouritism against renewables.  
Lack of access to 
appropriate finance 
Establishment of RE financial 
instruments within domestic banks 
by Government with lower interest 
rates 
 Strengthening fiscal and monetary instruments in the country to reduce 
policy rates given to domestic banks and subsequently curb high interest 
charges on credit facilities. 
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5.2 Conclusion 
As indicated by Barnett et al., (2016), there is no laid down guide in identifying the best 
approaches to address challenges being faced in the power sector. However, the ability 
to design and implement an appropriate intervention is heavily dependent on local 
research. From the discussion, it comes out clearly that there is a need to enhance 
efficiency and productivity within the off-taker market to help boost renewable energy 
investment in Ghana. This was identified to have multiplier or ripple benefits in the off-
taker market as the ability to achieve that addresses objectives of other policies in the off-
taking market. It is further observed that either approach i.e. privatisation or enhanced 
management of ECG can achieve the desirable result in the off-taker market, although 
the privatisation policy is heavily criticised due to the lack of broad-based consultation. 
On the other hand, the improved management policy turns to receive overwhelming 
acceptance due to its potential to achieve the results that are envisaged to be achieved 
through the privatisation mode, while addressing the concerns fueling the agitation 
against the privatisation policy. Despite the huge support base for both policies, some 
opposing and supporting institutions interviewed together, noted that an independent 
ECG devoid of government interference and effective prepaid metering system is the 
policy that could yield similar or better results. Likewise, effective checks and balances 
on the power sector and the creation of good regulatory environment have been 
advanced as key coalition policies for improving technical efficiency and competitive off-
taker market respectively. Therefore, the way forward in addressing the off-taker risk is 
to have a hybrid privatisation process where both local and foreign investors can own 
shares but at ceilings which together are lesser than government of Ghana’s share as 
well as ensuring the independence of the ECG from government interference, expansion 
of the facilities of the prepaid metering system, ensuring effective checks and balances 
and the creation of good regulatory environment in the power sector. These will enhance 
efficiency, credibility and productivity in the power sector, which in the long run, will 
promote investment in RE in Ghana.  
The faulty regulatory challenges obstructing the investment within the renewable energy 
sector can be addressed effectively not only by the three identified promising policies (i.e. 
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establish a full-time high level IPP facilitator in the power sector; establishment of a 
reliable and transparent full-cost tariff pricing system; and full implementation of the RE-
Act and its enshrined subsidiary instruments (Net-metering, mini-grid systems, and the 
RE fund and levies), but also by structuring the subsidiary instruments of the RE Act to 
be incentivising to the final consumer and investors. From the discussion, though the 
establishment of a full-time high level IPP facilitator and a reliable and transparent full 
cost tariff pricing system received high level of support from various institutions, enforcing 
and activating existing IPP facilitation regulations emerged as an alternative coalition 
policy to the establishment of a full time high level IPP in the power sector. In addition, 
the ability to make the net-metering, mini-grid systems, FiT, and RE Fund much more 
incentivising to encourage consumers and investors will facilitate investment in the RE 
sector.        
The establishment of a RE financial instruments within domestic banks by Government 
with lower interest rates is a necessary step that could address the lack of access to 
appropriate finance in the domestic market to cushion investment in renewable energy. 
This policy was accorded very strong endorsement and support levels from various 
institutions with little oppositions. As the analysis revealed, there is the need for other 
macro-economic risks to be mitigated before it can attain its full effect.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: List of stakeholders for the in-depth interview on identification of Ghana’s 
binding constraints to RE investments 
Category Stakeholders 
 
 
 
Investors 
 
NEK (Ghana) 
Ghana Capital Partners  
Lekela Power 
Blue Energy Company 
VRA/NEDCO 
Biogas Technology  
Solar Light Co. Ltd* 
  
 
 
Potential Investors 
Private Enterprise Federation  
Sahel-Sahara Bank 
UT BANK* 
AGI 
  
 
 
Non-Investors 
Energy Commission of Ghana* 
Kite Ghana* 
Africa Centre for Energy Policy* 
Ghana Investment Promotion Center* 
NB: * Stakeholders interviewed  
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Appendix 2: List of stakeholders for in-depth interview on discussion and analyses of the 
PE of Ghana’s binding constraints to RE investments 
Institution Focal Person Reason 
Electricity Company of 
Ghana (ECG) 
Managing Director*  Main off-taker in Ghana’s 
power sector 
KITE-Ghana Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO)*  
Policy Advocator in Energy, 
Technology and 
Environment sectors in 
Ghana. 
African Center for Energy 
Policy (ACEP) 
Deputy Executive Director* Policy advocate and energy 
adviser 
Millennium Development 
Authority (MiDA) 
Team of three* 
1. M&E and Economic 
Advisor 
2. Energy efficiency & 
Demand side management 
Project Manager 
3. M&E expert 
Government arm in charge 
of Ghana’s Compact Two 
IMANI Ghana Founding Director** Policy Advocator 
Trade Union Congress 
(TUC) 
Deputy Secretary General**  Mouthpiece of Labour 
Unions in Ghana 
Institute of Fiscal Studies Senior Economist** Adviser in Fiscal and 
Financial policies 
Association of Ghana 
Industries (AGI) 
President of AGI** Mouthpiece of industries 
Integrated Social 
Development Centre 
(ISODEC) 
Executive Director**  NGO with special focus on 
human rights and social 
justices  
African Energy Consortium Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) **  
Policy advocate in energy 
related issues 
Ghana Institute for Public 
Policy Options (GIPPO) 
Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) #  
Policy Advocator  
Energy Commission Head, Renewable Energy 
Promotion* 
Regulator of the power 
sector 
Solar Light Ghana Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO)* 
Industry player 
KASA Coordinator* Coordinates advocacy on  
dialogue on natural 
resources  
Public Utilities Workers 
Union (PUWU) 
General Secretary** Steer the welfare of utilities’ 
workers in Ghana 
NB: * Stakeholders interviewed #Stakeholders that were quoted from other 
sources **Stakeholders that could not be interviewed nor quoted 
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